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STANDING AS CHANNELING IN THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE AGE 
Dru Stevenson* 
Sonny Eckhart** 
Abstract: For several decades, courts have approached citizen suits with 
judicially created rules for standing. These rules are vague and unwork-
able, often serving merely as a screening mechanism for docket manage-
ment. The use of standing rules to screen cases, in turn, yields inconsis-
tent decisions and tribunal splits along partisan lines, suggesting that 
courts are using these rules in citizen suits as a proxy for the merits. Many 
have suggested that Congress could, or should, provide guidelines for 
standing. This Article takes the suggestion a step further and argues that 
Congress has implicitly delegated the matter to the administrative agen-
cies with primary enforcement authority over the subject matter. Courts 
regularly allow agencies to fill gaps in their respective statutes, so Con-
gress’s silence on a point often constitutes discretionary leeway for the 
agency. Agencies already have explicit statutory authority to preempt citi-
zen suits or define violations for which parties may sue; the existing statu-
tory framework therefore suggests that agencies could promulgate rules 
for standing in citizen suits. Moreover, agencies have an advantage over 
courts in terms of expertise about which suits best represent the public 
interest. Further, for suits against the agencies themselves, agencies could 
default to the “special solicitude for states” rule. Finally, this Article ex-
plains how standing can function as a beneficial channeling tool rather 
than an ad hoc screening device, by allowing agencies to align citizen suits 
more closely with the larger public interest. 
Introduction 
 Congress authorizes citizen suits for the enforcement of certain 
federal laws, but the authorizing statutes do not delineate any criteria 
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for parties to have standing to bring such suits.1 Courts have derived 
standing rules (ambiguous enough to be standards rather than actual 
rules) from the U.S. Constitution and jurisprudential concerns.2 Yet 
the judicial approach has proved unwieldy and yields inconsistent, un-
predictable results even from the same court.3 This Article proposes a 
public solution, using recent environmental litigation as a hypothetical 
model as to how our thesis could achieve positive, and practical, solu-
tions. 
 The need for Congress to give the courts guidance about standing 
for citizen suits has received mention in U.S. Supreme Court opinions 
and focused attention in academic articles.4 Numerous commentators 
                                                                                                                      
 
1 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2006) (“[A]ny person may commence a civil action on 
his own behalf . . . .”). 
2 For instance, the U.S. Supreme Court has frequently noted that the standing doc-
trine preserves the separation of powers, a central component of our constitutional 
scheme. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (“[T]he core 
component of standing is an essential and unchanging part . . . of Article III.”); Allen v. 
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (“[T]he law of Article III standing is built on a single 
basic idea—the idea of separation of powers.”); see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 601–02 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting) (arguing that the standing doctrine mediates the separation of power 
between the coordinate branches of government); Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing 
as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 881, 894 (1983) 
(couching support for the doctrine in a separation-of-powers argument). Similarly, other 
prudential concerns may affect whether a court may properly adjudicate a dispute. See, e.g., 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204–06, 217, 237 (1962) (holding that the plaintiffs had stand-
ing, but that their claims presented a nonjusticiable political question). Some commenta-
tors, however, doubt whether the Court’s justiciability doctrines, including the standing 
doctrine, are motivated by fidelity to constitutional principles. See generally Robert J. 
Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 Cornell L. 
Rev. 393 (1996) (arguing that the Supreme Court must reformulate its justiciability doc-
trines to better account for Federalist principles). 
3 See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Limiting Article III Standing to “Accidental” Plaintiffs: Les-
sons from Environmental and Animal Law Cases, 45 Ga. L. Rev. 1, 52 (2010) (“[S]tanding 
rules are indefinite and elastic, and the justices have applied them capriciously. . . . Not 
surprisingly, the Court has reached inconsistent (even contradictory) results in cases that 
presented materially indistinguishable facts . . . .”). 
4 See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 501 (2009) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(noting Congress’s ability to create by statute Article III injuries); Massachusetts v. EPA, 
549 U.S. 497, 516–17 (2007) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580) (encouraging Congress to 
define standing statutorily); FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 19–20 (1998) (discussing how Con-
gress can define injury); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that 
Congress has the power to define standing and causation); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 
501 (1975) (noting that Congress can grant a right of action to persons who would other-
wise be barred by prudential standing rules); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 
n.3 (1973) (“Congress may enact statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which cre-
ates standing, even though no injury would exist without the statute.”); see also infra note 5 
(collecting scholarly commentary). In his Lujan concurrence, Justice Anthony Kennedy 
also stated: 
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have argued that Congress can, and perhaps should, address the issue.5 
We take the next step and argue that Congress already has—albeit im-
pliedly—authorized administrative agencies to give such guidance via 
promulgated regulations.6 Such agencies are in the best position, from 
the standpoint of our government’s institutional design, to do so. And 
these agencies have primary enforcement authority, by statute, for the 
subject matter of the citizen suits.7 
 Suits brought from outside the agency, under the relevant statute, 
take two forms: citizen enforcement actions against private-sector viola-
tors,8 and suits against the agency to compel more enforcement or reg-
                                                                                                                      
In exercising this power, however, Congress must at the very least identify the 
injury it seeks to vindicate and relate the injury to the class of persons enti-
tled to bring suit. 
. . . [We would exceed constitutional limitations if] we were to entertain citi-
zen suits to vindicate the public’s nonconcrete interest in the proper admini-
stration of the laws. 
504 U.S. at 580–81 (citation omitted). 
5 See Kimberly N. Brown, What’s Left Standing? FECA Citizen Suits and the Battle for Judi-
cial Review, 55 U. Kan. L. Rev. 677, 688, 690–94 (2007) (arguing that the Akins decision left 
Congress with significant power to define standing); Sean Connelly, Congressional Authority 
to Expand the Class of Persons with Standing to Seek Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 39 
Admin. L. Rev. 139, 161–63 (1987) (arguing that Congress has the power to expand stand-
ing); James Dumont, Beyond Standing: Proposals for Congressional Response to Supreme Court 
“Standing” Decisions, 13 Vt. L. Rev. 675, 678, 684–89 (1989) (arguing that Congress may 
use its power to establish Article I courts to bypass the constitutional minimums Article III 
standing attempts to protect); William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 Yale L.J. 
221, 223–24 (1988) (arguing that if a duty is statutory, Congress should have unlimited 
power to define who can enforce the duty); Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and 
Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 613, 616–17 (1999) (arguing 
that the Akins decision expands congressional authority to define standing); Cass R. Sun-
stein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 
163, 178 (1992) [hereinafter Sunstein, What’s Standing?] (stating that there is no evidence 
that Article III was intended to limit the ability of Congress to define standing). But see, e.g., 
John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 Duke L.J. 1219, 1226 (1993) 
(arguing that an act of Congress is unconstitutional if it directs a federal court to hear a 
case that does not meet the requirements of Article III standing). 
6 We are unaware of any academic literature advocating for this proposal; however, 
others have contemplated related proposals from a narrower or tangential perspective. See 
Brian D. Galle, Can Federal Agencies Authorize Private Suits Under Section 1983?, 69 Brook. L. 
Rev. 163, 165 (2003) (proposing that § 1983 authorizes federal agencies to make their 
regulations enforceable by citizens); Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: 
Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 Colum. 
L. Rev. 1301, 1349–58 (2008) (proposing that Congress grant the Securities and Exchange 
Commission the power to screen Rule 10b-5 class actions by deciding who may file such 
claims as well as whom they may file them against). 
7 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(3) (2006) (providing the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) with primary enforcement authority). 
8 See, e.g., Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2011). 
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ulation.9 There are legal distinctions between these two types of ac-
tions, besides the obvious difference of the defendants in each in-
stance. In the latter type, challenging agency inaction, the claims tech-
nically proceed under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),10 but 
the substance of the claims depend on the same substantive statute as 
the first type of citizen suits. Even though the two types of actions are 
distinct, they relate to each other enough to discuss them together. 
                                                                                                                     
 This dichotomy, however, leads to our bifurcated thesis. First, we 
make the rather bold suggestion that agencies can, and should, deline-
ate some parameters regarding the injury-in-fact and causation elements 
of standing for citizen suits against third-party polluters. The second 
thesis is a more tentative suggestion: agencies should officially adopt the 
Supreme Court’s “special solicitude for states”11 in the second type of 
case, suits challenging agency inaction. This second rule would not bar 
citizen suits against agencies, but would simply give a preference—in 
terms of standing to sue—to state attorneys general, and would use the 
state-brought suit as a benchmark to assess the legitimacy of other plain-
tiffs in public interest lawsuits against agencies. 
 As mentioned above, the Supreme Court has invited Congress to 
give guidance about standing for citizen suits, as citizen suits are one of 
the most significant contexts in which standing is an issue.12 In addi-
tion, there is an emerging scholarly consensus that Congress can, and 
should, accept this invitation.13 If we accept this premise, then it follows 
that Congress can delegate such authority to the appropriate govern-
ment agencies to propose and adopt the guidelines for those cases over 
which the agency already has primary enforcement authority. 
 The most obvious argument supporting this suggestion is the agen-
cy’s specialization and expertise.14 Judicial doctrines of deference to 
agency interpretation of statutes, which rest upon a presumption of 
agency expertise and resources, suggest that courts would also accede to 
an agency’s rules about standing. The deference afforded under the 
 
9 See, e.g., Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 505. 
10 Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). 
11 See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 520. 
12 See supra note 4 and accompanying text (providing examples of citizen suits in which 
standing presented a question). 
13 See, e.g., supra note 5 (summarizing the scholarly views). But see Heather Elliott, Con-
gress’s Inability to Solve Standing Problems, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 159, 161–65 (2011) (arguing that 
Congress has little power to resolve standing problems). 
14 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 
(1984). 
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Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc. and its 1944 decision in Skidmore v. Swift & Co. accu-
rately presume that agencies have staff with relevant expertise and train-
ing, that agencies’ specialized functions provide them with opportuni-
ties to analyze the issues deeply, and that they have a repeat-player’s 
vantage point on the litigation surrounding their governing statutes.15 
An agency’s mandate from Congress encourages it to conduct extensive 
research as it formulates its position;16 agencies also collect vast amounts 
of useful data via the reporting requirements imposed on the regulated 
industries.17 Applying this logic to the standing requirements for citizen 
suits, the agencies have superior information and expertise to discern 
the fine line between citizen suits that benefit the public and those that 
are unnecessary, vexatious, or abusive. The APA’s prescribed standards 
for judicial review (“arbitrary and capricious” is the default rule)18 fur-
ther bolster the regime of judicial deference to agency decisions, at least 
where those decisions are well researched and subject to deliberation. 
 Congress delegates authority not only by what it says, but also by 
what it does not say.19 Other commentators have demonstrated that 
statutory ambiguity and gaps are the actual mechanism by which the 
laws delegate discretion to administrators.20 Statutory precision, by con-
                                                                                                                      
 
15 See id.; Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 137–40 (1944). 
16 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7403 (2006) (requiring the EPA to establish a national research 
and development program); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (“[T]he Administrator’s interpreta-
tion represents a reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing interests and is enti-
tled to deference: the regulatory scheme is technical and complex, the agency considered 
the matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion, and the decision involves reconciling con-
flicting policies.”). 
17 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7414 (authorizing the Administrator to require recordkeeping, 
periodic compliance certifications, and the submission of reports). 
18 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44. 
19 See, e.g., Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (“Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency 
on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not 
substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation 
made by the administrator of an agency.”). 
20 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Judith N. Levi, Regulatory Variables and Statutory In-
terpretation, 73 Wash. U. L.Q. 1103, 1107–08 (1995). Professors William Eskridge and Ju-
dith Levi argue that governmental discretion or decision making is often delegated 
through what they call “regulatory variables,” linguistic devices in the statute that leave the 
delegated interpreter a range of meanings and applications. See id. They eventually shift to 
the term “regulatory variability” out of fear that readers will imagine a list of magic words 
that delegate discretion. Id. at 1107. It is well established that the legislature intends to 
delegate some of its authority to agencies. The focus here is on the mechanism for delega-
tion, which is essentially a linguistic one. Id. at 1108–09. Some portions of enabling statutes 
may be specific and directive, other provisions may contain ambiguity, requiring the au-
thorized official or administrator to exercise discretion to fill in the gaps or flesh out the 
practical meaning. This linguistic feature of vagueness or ambiguity inherently delegates 
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trast, functions as a constraint, issuing instructions that an administra-
tor must carry out mechanically.21 The idea that ambiguity confers dis-
cretion is also the essence of the Chevron doctrine—where the statute is 
ambiguous, courts must defer to agency interpretations and gap-filling 
as long as it is merely “reasonable,” which is a very low threshold.22 In 
fact, the Supreme Court’s most recent Chevron-based decision treats 
statutory ambiguity as a mandate for the agency to craft the official in-
terpretation or to fill in the gaps on its own, without superimposing ju-
dicial precedents onto the unclear portion of the law.23 
 The citizen-suit statutes are silent about standing.24 Congress, how-
ever, situated each of these provisions within a longer act that confers 
primary enforcement authority on an agency.25 The enactments con-
                                                                                                                      
 
authority. See id. at 1109–10. As Professors Eskridge and Levi observe, “The level of linguis-
tic generality permits an inference about the speaker’s willingness to delegate gap-filling 
discretion to another person (i.e., police officers and judges). The more general the statu-
tory term, the more discretion the directive is implicitly vesting in the implementing offi-
cial.” Id. at 1111 & n.15 (noting that this discretion may be “vested deliberately or inadver-
tently”). Stronger examples of regulatory variables are “reasonable,” “substantial,” “good 
faith,” and the phrase “all deliberate speed.” See id. at 1113. 
21 See William D. Araiza, In Praise of a Skeletal APA: Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness 
Alliance, Judicial Remedies for Agency Inaction, and the Questionable Value of Amending the APA, 
56 Admin. L. Rev. 979, 999 (2004) (expressing “concern that well-meaning statutory preci-
sion may in fact end up increasing the rigidity of the administrative system”); Roger Colin-
vaux, Charity in the 21st Century: Trending Toward Decay, 11 Fla. Tax Rev. 1, 48 (2011) (de-
scribing statutory precision in one section of the tax code as congressional “micro-
management”); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1, 108 (2001) (“If a majority in Congress prefers to pursue precise legislative policies, 
it can enact detailed and specific statutes, increasing its ability to control discretion in the 
application of its commands . . . .”). Indeed, courts have held that statutory precision con-
strains agency discretion. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 
1987) (upholding precise requirements of a statute and invalidating the agency’s de 
minimis rule). Yet, the Supreme Court has invalidated statutes that are too rigid and do 
not allow for agencies to consider the factual circumstances of individual cases. 
22 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. 
23 See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 713 
(2011) (holding that all agency regulations should receive Chevron deference regardless of 
which agency promulgated them “when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the 
agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law”); see also Tigers Eye Trading, LLC 
v. Comm’r, 138 T.C. No. 6, 2012 WL 445944, at *15 (2012) (stating that federal courts must 
defer to Internal Revenue Service regulations in interpreting the tax code). 
24 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2006). 
25 See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006); Energy Supply and 
Environmental Coordination Act, 15 U.S.C. § 797(b)(5) (2006); Toxic Substances Control 
Act, 15 U.S.C § 2619 (2006); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2006); Surface 
Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1270(a) (2006); Water Pollution Preven-
tion and Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2006); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a), (g) 
(2006); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (2006); National Environmental Policy 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4331(c) (2006); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (2006); Clean 
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tain general standards— “intelligible principles” in the jargon of dele-
gation analysis—and entrust the agency with authority to work out the 
details, set standards, create a monitoring and enforcement regime, 
and so forth.26 Included in this delegated authority to fill in the details, 
we argue, is the unanswered question of who has standing to bring the 
related citizen suits. Legislative silence on nearly every other matter, the 
Court has held, impliedly puts the issues under the agency’s discretion 
and purview.27 There is no reason to think that standing should be a 
singular exception to this paradigm. 
 Moreover, Congress expressly authorizes agencies to cabin all po-
tential citizen suits through preemption and displacement.28 Whenever 
an agency commences litigation against a violator—such as an indus-
trial polluter—that suit automatically preempts any duplicative citizen 
suits against the same defendant.29 Thus, an agency can effectively 
block a citizen suit that it deems contrary to public policy. Similarly, 
through even inchoate regulations, agencies can displace related public 
interest suits brought under common law doctrines, as seen recently in 
the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in American Electric Power Co. v. Con-
necticut.30 Furthermore, agency regulations and standards can define 
the actual violations for which citizens could sue.31 
                                                                                                                      
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2006); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a) (2006). But see Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136a (2006). 
26 Indeed, a regulatory statute, such as the Clean Air Act, will typically include con-
gressional findings and a congressional declaration that establish the federal government’s 
authority to regulate and outline the general purposes of the regulatory scheme. See, e.g., 
42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)--(b). Additionally, the statute will often authorize the implementing 
agency to conduct research, create programs, develop systems for monitoring compliance, 
and take enforcement action. See, e.g., id. §§ 7403(a)–(c), 7413. 
27 See, e.g., Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. 
28 See, e.g., Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 255 
(2004) (discussing preemption); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 316–19 (1981) 
(discussing displacement); see also Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2538–39 (holding that 
the Clean Air Act’s delegation of power to the EPA to regulate carbon dioxide emissions 
displaced the plaintiffs’ common law right to abatement). 
29 See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(B) (“No action may be commenced . . . if the Administrator 
or State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil action . . . .”). 
30 See Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2537 (“[T]he Clean Air Act and the EPA actions 
it authorizes displace any federal common law right to seek abatement of carbon-dioxide 
emissions . . . .”). 
31 See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(A) (requiring the EPA to publish a list of stationary 
sources that “cause[], or contribute[] significantly to, air pollution which may reasonably 
be anticipated to endanger public health”); see also id. § 7411(e) (“After the effective date 
of standards of performance promulgated under this section, it shall be unlawful for any 
owner or operator of any new source to operate such source in violation of any standard of 
performance applicable to such source.”). 
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 In other words, the legislative silence on standing effectively dele-
gates the question to the relevant agency to answer, just as it does with 
any other question under the statute. The structural aspects of the stat-
ute that functionally allow the agency to preempt, displace, and chan-
nel potential citizen suits imply that defining standing would also be 
appropriate for the same agency. Congress has, we argue, already left 
this matter to the agencies, even if the agencies have not acknowledged 
this up to now. 
 Even apart from the agencies’ expertise, longstanding judicial def-
erence, and the implicit delegation within the statutes themselves, an 
additional factor argues in favor of agencies shouldering the burden of 
defining standing. This point is essentially political: agencies are subject 
to the notice-and-comment procedures of the APA.32 These procedures 
introduce a democratic aspect into the rulemaking we propose here. 
Thus, rather than have courts define standing by judicial fiat—which 
inevitably invites complaints about judicial activism—an agency rule 
about standing for citizen suits would involve a substantial period of 
public comment, plus the agency’s duty to respond to significant points 
raised during the comment period. Activist groups that regularly bring 
citizen suits33 would have an opportunity to weigh in on the standing 
rules for future public interest lawsuits. Similarly, proposed agency reg-
ulations must undergo Office of Management and Budget (OMB) re-
view,34 and this scrutiny provides another layer of political buffering 
through the President, who usually supervises OMB closely.35 
                                                                                                                      
 
32 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)–(b) (2006) (defining the scope of the APA’s notice-and-
comment requirements); see also id. §§ 556, 557 (providing procedures for hearings and 
appeals that ensure due process). 
33 See Gabriel H. Markoff, Note, The Invisible Barrier: Issue Exhaustion as a Threat to Plu-
ralism in Administrative Rulemaking, 90 Tex. L. Rev. 1065, 1082–83 (2012) (noting the inter-
connectedness between participation in agency notice-and-comment procedures and sub-
sequent litigation regarding ensuing agency rules); see also Jonathan H. Adler, Stand or 
Deliver: Citizen Suits, Standing, and Environmental Protection, 12 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y F. 
39, 48 (2001) (noting that a small number of public interest groups file a large percentage 
of environmental citizen suits). 
34 See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. 
§ 601 (requiring federal agencies to submit significant regulatory action for review by the 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) within OMB); see also Exec. Order 
No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215 (2011) (reaffirming Executive Order 12,866). 
35 See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2290 (2001) 
(concluding that OMB review enables the President to assert control over the administra-
tive bureaucracy); Mark Seidenfeld, The Psychology of Accountability and Political Review of 
Agency Rules, 51 Duke L.J. 1059, 1091 (2001) (concluding that OMB review encourages 
agencies to “formulate rules that are closer to the preferences of the president”); see also 
Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Rationalism in Regulation, 108 Mich. L. 
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 There is a growing need for agencies to step into this role. Recent 
decisions by the Supreme Court suggest an increasingly liberal—or at 
least confusing—approach to standing.36 In American Electric, the Court 
split evenly on the question of standing.37 Had Justice Sonia Sotomayor 
not recused herself from the decision, it would apparently have gone 5–
4 in favor of recognizing standing; this would have opened the door for 
innumerable future suits involving similar parties.38 Additionally, as citi-
zen suits continue to proliferate under the U.S. Code39 and under 
common law tort theories (as a way of circumnavigating the Code),40 
the courts’ need for guidance on standing increases correspondingly. 
Courts will need agencies to play gatekeeper in order for federal judi-
cial dockets to remain manageable. 
 At the same time, there is a concern that courts could go in the 
other direction and functionally eliminate citizen suits by taking a 
                                                                                                                      
Rev. 877, 904 (2010) (book review) (noting that “[t]he OMB director, who typically repre-
sents OIRA in White House councils and before the president when an agency appeals an 
OIRA decision, invariably has a closer working relationship with the president than has the 
head of any regulatory agency”); James R. Harvey III, Note, Loyalty in Government Litigation: 
Department of Justice Representation of Agency Clients, 37 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1569, 1590 
(1996) (noting that OMB is used more frequently than the Attorney General as “[c]ounsel 
for the President”); Note, OIRA Avoidance, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 994, 1001 (2011) (noting 
that “OMB and OIRA traditionally enjoy a closer working relationship with the President 
than the other agencies do”). 
36 See Pushaw, supra note 3, at 49--54 (chronicling the Court’s unsteady application of 
its own rules on standing). 
37Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2535. 
38 See infra notes 148–154 and accompanying text. 
39 See, e.g., Summers, 555 U.S. at 490; Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 
U.S. 587, 593 (2007); Daimler-Chrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 338 (2006); Natural 
Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 658 F.3d 200, 201 (2d Cir. 2011); Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Energy, 654 F.3d 496, 497 (4th Cir. 2011); Lake Carriers Ass’n v. EPA, 652 F.3d 1, 3 
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (per curiam); Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 645 F.3d 978, 982 
(8th Cir. 2011); Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass’n v. Goldstene, 639 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir. 
2011); Barnum Timber Co. v. EPA, 633 F.3d 894, 895 (9th Cir. 2011); Cal. Wilderness Coal. 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 2011); Nat’l Petrochemicals & Refin-
ers Ass’n v. EPA, 630 F.3d 145, 147 (D.C. Cir. 2010); S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. v. 
FERC, 621 F.3d 1085, 1089–90 (9th Cir. 2010); White v. United States, 601 F.3d 545, 547 
(6th Cir. 2010); Catawba Cnty. v. EPA, 571 F.3d 20, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (per curiam); Ctr. 
for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 563 F.3d 466, 471–72 (D.C. Cir. 2009); 
Nulankeyutmonen Nkihtaqmikon v. Impson, 503 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2007); Pub. Citizen, 
Inc. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 489 F.3d 1279, 1284 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (per cu-
riam); Sierra Club v. Johnson, 436 F.3d 1269, 1272 (11th Cir. 2006). 
40 See, e.g., Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2534 (involving a public nuisance action 
against energy companies for their alleged contributions to climate change); Comer v. Mur-
phy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 855 (5th Cir. 2009) (same), vacated en banc, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th 
Cir. 2010) (lacking quorum); Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 
863, 868–69 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (same). 
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“blunt-instrument” approach to standing.41 In contrast, the specialized 
federal agencies are more likely to offer nuanced guidelines.42 Citizen 
suits are a subset of a larger movement of public interest litigation, 
which includes cases like the landmark tobacco lawsuit brought by state 
attorneys general, and class action lawsuits brought by plaintiffs’ attor-
neys.43 Urbanization and globalization have made citizens’ lives and 
interests intersect (and collide) much more than in previous eras. Ac-
cordingly, the public interest is a far more valid legal concern today 
than it was in the agrarian common law period, when many of our pro-
cedural protocols evolved.44 
 It seems appropriate at this point to turn to a few examples to illus-
trate what we envision the agencies doing. The traditional Article III 
standing doctrine has three prongs: injury-in-fact, causation, and re-
dressability.45 The last prong, redressability, falls squarely within the ju-
diciary’s institutional competence, and thus should probably remain 
with the courts, as they have superior information about what remedies 
they can impose.46 Injury-in-fact, by contrast, is something about which 
an agency has more information and expertise. For example, suppose 
that for citizen suits over air pollution, the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) defined a minimum threshold of environmental harm 
that merits an enforcement action, such as the affected geographic area 
(say, more than twenty acres) or metric tons of emissions (the Clean Air 
Act regulations already contain similar benchmarks).47 Standing re-
                                                                                                                      
 
41 See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 535 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing in favor of strict 
standing requirements); cf. David I. Walker, The Challenge of Improving the Long-Term Focus of 
Executive Pay, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 435, 460 (2010) (referring to “mandatory, one-size-fits-all 
vesting periods” in executive compensation regulations as “arbitrary and extremely blunt 
instruments”). 
42 See Peter L. Strauss, Administrative Justice in the United States 135 (2d ed. 
2002) (describing the expertise of agency staff). 
43 See infra notes 109–121 and accompanying text. 
44 Cf. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 504–05 (describing the rise in carbon dioxide emissions 
and its related climatological effects). 
45 See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S at 560–61. The doctrine itself falls within a much larger con-
cept of justiciability, through which the Supreme Court interprets the words “Cases” and 
“Controversies” to implicate certain limitations on judicial power. See U.S. Const. art. III, 
§ 2; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law 62 (4th ed. 2011) (describing the 
constitutional requirements for standing). 
46 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580–81 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (suggesting that if Congress 
were to adopt standing guidelines, it should do so only for injury and causation). 
47 Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1) (2006) (defining “major” hazardous air pollutants as any 
source that emits or could emit ten tons per year of any hazardous pollutant or twenty-five 
tons per year of any combination of hazardous pollutants); id. § 7472 (defining a Class I 
area to include national wilderness areas larger than five thousand acres and national 
parks larger than six thousand acres); id. § 7479(1) (defining “major” sources under the 
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quirements that reference such benchmarks would bring symmetry to 
this area of law. This Article uses such examples—twenty acres or twenty 
tons—purely for illustration; the EPA’s actual standard might be far dif-
ferent.48 
 Similarly, regarding the causation prong, the Supreme Court has 
swung widely between extremes—from United States v. Students Challeng-
ing Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP)49 in 1973 to Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife 50 in 1992 and back to Massachusetts v. EPA51 in 2007. Yet the 
EPA has decades of experience defining chains of causation for liability 
under CERCLA,52 RCRA,53 TSCA,54 and FIFRA55—tracing lines of own-
ership and responsibility for both the affected land and the contami-
nants themselves (manufacturers, sellers, users, and disposers).56 For 
                                                                                                                      
Clean Air Act as those that directly emit or have the potential to emit one hundred tons 
per year or more from twenty-eight listed stationary sources or any other source that could 
potentially emit 250 tons per year or more); 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.166(b)(23)(i), 52.21(b)(23)(i) 
(2011) (discussing de minimis thresholds for pollutants regulated under the Clean Air 
Act). 
48 The EPA is the congressionally designated “expert” in regulating the pollutants in 
our atmosphere. See, e.g., Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2539 (“The expert agency is sure-
ly better equipped to do the job than . . . . [f]ederal judges [who] lack the scientific, eco-
nomic, and technological resources an agency can utilize . . . .”). Therefore, we propose 
that the EPA is in the best position to determine the most viable and practical scope of 
enforceable injuries. Cf. Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 323 (“The agency imposed the conditions it 
considered best suited to further the goals of the Act . . . .”). 
49 412 U.S. 669, 685 (1973) (8–0 decision) (holding that five law students had standing 
to challenge a nationwide railroad freight increase). 
50 504 U.S. at 571--78 (7–2 decision) (holding that the defendants lacked standing to 
challenge an agency rule defining the territorial scope of the Endangered Species Act 
because their claimed injury was not concrete and particularized). 
51 549 U.S. at 526 (5–4 decision) (granting Massachusetts standing to challenge EPA 
inaction under the Clean Air Act because of Massachusetts’ special interest in protecting 
its citizens). 
52 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 
(CERCLA), Pub. L. No. 96–510, 94 Stat. 2767, amended by Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 
1613 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006)). 
53 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act  of 1976 (RCRA), Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 
Stat. 2795 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k (2006)). 
54 Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2697 (2006)). 
55 Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 
Stat. 973 (1972) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136–136y (2006)). 
56 See 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (defining “hazardous wastes” so that the EPA may regulate 
generation, transportation, or disposal that may “cause, or significantly contribute to an 
increase in mortality or an increase in a serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible 
illness”); United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 257, 264–65 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(holding that under Section 107 of CERCLA, a plaintiff must show a causal connection 
between a release or threatened release and the incurrence of response costs (citing 42 
U.S.C. § 9607)). 
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certain environmental citizen suits, the EPA could promulgate very 
well-informed, nuanced rules about the appropriate lines for courts to 
draw on the causation element of standing. 
 Regarding suits against the agency itself, to which our secondary 
thesis is directed, we recognize that there is a potential conflict of inter-
est for agencies to delimit who has the right to sue them. Our tenta-
tiveness on this prong of our proposal arises out of this problem. Nev-
ertheless, the risk of agency self-interest is minimal given that our 
proposed rule originated with the Supreme Court, in Massachusetts, ra-
ther than with an agency.57 This is the “special solicitude for states” 
rule.58 Promoting the public interest is the primary virtue of such cases. 
And suits to compel an agency to regulate are inherently policy driven, 
so it is appropriate to favor plaintiffs who are more likely to represent 
broad public interests, such as state attorneys general.59 
 This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides, rather briefly, the 
necessary background on the origin and development of the doctrine of 
standing, as well as the development and role of citizen suits.60 On the 
former point, we highlight the relative newness of the concept and the 
still underdeveloped nature of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on 
standing. Moreover, the emergence of the doctrine of standing coin-
cides historically with the advent of citizen suits, which present the 
thorniest scenarios for courts in this arena.61 To some extent, the prob-
lem of standing and the nature of citizen suits are inseparable, and Part 
I attempts to situate standing within the context of public interest litiga-
tion, and citizen suits within the framework of the standing require-
ments. Both standing and citizen suits are features of the larger modern 
phenomenon of public interest litigation.62 The statutory component of 
the standing doctrine (i.e., citizen-suit provisions), and the relative in-
fancy of the jurisprudence on the point, can give a background ration-
alization for our argument that administrative agencies should provide 
input to develop the doctrine of standing in the future. 
 After this background, Part II provides a foreground for the dis-
cussion: a recent case that is particularly illustrative for the arguments 
                                                                                                                      
57 See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519–20. 
58 See id. 
59 Cf. id. (granting deference to state attorneys general because they act in the interest 
of their constituents). 
60 See infra notes 66–121 and accompanying text. 
61 See infra notes 66–83 and accompanying text. 
62 See e.g., Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 504–06 (discussing standing in the context of envi-
ronmental protection litigation). 
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that follow.63 The Supreme Court’s decision, in 2011, in American Elec-
tric included a striking discussion of standing, which reveals both a 
trend on the Court regarding this issue, as well as an urgent need for 
extrajudicial input in this area. 
                                                                                                                     
 Part III is the heart of the Article, presenting the main arguments 
for our primary thesis—that some of the definitions for standing to 
bring citizen suits can, and should, come from the administrative agen-
cies entrusted with primary enforcement of the same laws or regula-
tions.64 The arguments are partly descriptive and statutory—describing 
Congress’s implicit delegation of authority to the agencies to promul-
gate rules on this point—and partly normative, arguing that the agen-
cies have the most expertise and best information to craft such rules. 
Besides arguing that agencies are a particularly appropriate source of 
guidance on this point, we also provide reasons for the urgency of ex-
trajudicial input on issues of standing—the current trend toward judi-
cial acquiescence, the proliferation of citizen-suit statues, and the in-
creasing market share of public interest litigation in our legal system 
overall. This Part will also attempt to anticipate and answer substantial 
objections to our thesis. 
 Part IV explores our secondary thesis—that states, through their 
attorneys general, should have preferential standing rules in public in-
terest litigation against federal agencies, at least compared to private 
citizens or special interest groups.65 The main thrust of the argument is 
that these state officials better represent the public interest, in a holistic 
sense, than do private-party litigants. The Supreme Court, however, has 
also provided a few pragmatic and legal-formalist arguments for giving 
states special solicitude to have standing to bring claims against federal 
agencies. At the outset, we offer the disclaimer that we believe this sec-
ondary thesis is severable from the first. Thus, a reader could reject this 
part of the argument and still embrace the primary thesis, regarding 
citizen suits. Even so, the two prongs of our argument relate closely 
enough that they merit being discussed together. 
 This Article’s bifurcated thesis is premised on the proposal that 
standing should no longer serve primarily as a screening device, used 
to mitigate the quantity of plaintiffs navigating through the judicial sys-
tem. Rather, standing should be viewed as a channeling mechanism, 
whereby all harmed individuals are channeled through procedural 
 
63 See infra notes 122–154 and accompanying text. 
64 See infra notes 155–299 and accompanying text. 
65 See infra notes 300–353 and accompanying text. 
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mechanisms that reveal the most egregiously injured plaintiffs, that is, 
those plaintiffs with the best (or worst, from the individual perspective) 
harms. Viewing standing as a doctrine that promotes channeling actu-
ally accomplishes the purposes the screening view purports to accom-
plish, but as this Article will explain, also achieves increasingly consis-
tent results as to a critical threshold question such as standing. 
Consistent results thereby translate into better enforcement and great-
er understanding of our rights under federal statutes in the administra-
tive age. 
I. Standing and the Public Interest 
 Historically, the emergence of standing requirements and the rise 
of public interest litigation were interrelated,66 and both are more re-
cent developments than many lawyers and academics realize.67 Com-
pared to procedural protocols inherited from the common law era, the 
jurisprudence of standing is arguably still in its infancy—it remains un-
derdeveloped and undertheorized compared to other issues related to 
the definition of parties (such as privity, interpleader, indemnification, 
and accessory liability) and the other rules surrounding the com-
mencement of litigation (statutes of limitations, pleading requirements, 
jurisdiction and venue, ripeness, and so forth). Citizen suit statutes, and 
codification more generally, created new issues—including important 
preliminary issues like standing—that confronted courts in the twenti-
eth century.68 The following sections sketch the recent appearance of 
standing requirements and the simultaneous advent of public interest 
litigation.69 This brief background should help explain both the ap-
propriateness and the present urgency for extrajudicial input to de-
velop the boundaries of standing. 
                                                                                                                      
66 See Pushaw, supra note 3, at 32 (“The liberalization of standing sparked a huge rise 
in public interest litigation . . . .”). 
67 See Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Challenge and Reform 43 (2d ed. 
1996). Indeed, the Supreme Court mentioned the word “redressability” for the first time 
in 1982. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 242–44 (1982). The Court first used the word 
“redressable” in connection with “standing” in 1969. See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 
411, 424 (1969). Even the word “redress” seems to have appeared for the first time in asso-
ciation with standing requirements in 1924. See Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. United States (Chi-
cago Junction), 264 U.S. 258, 272 (1924). And states’ standing to sue first received mention 
in 1935. See Hopkins Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Cleary, 296 U.S. 315, 339–40 (1935) (hinting 
at a nascent version of the special solicitude rule, given the limited fora in which states can 
seek legal recourse). 
68 See, e.g., Elizabeth Magill, Standing for the Public: A Lost History, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1131, 
1168–69 (2009). 
69 See infra notes 70–121 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Origins of Modern Standing 
 Scholars have debated for decades about the origins of standing.70 
A consensus has emerged that the modern standing doctrine began 
somewhere around the time of the Supreme Court’s 1923 decision in 
Frothingham v. Mellon71 and its 1924 decision in Chicago Junction.72 The 
question of why the doctrine arose, however, dwarfs the question of 
when. Understanding this contentiousness may help rationalize why its 
current application places a glass ceiling on public interest litigants. 
 The majority view now rests in the “insulation thesis,”73 which pro-
poses that progressive Supreme Court justices manipulated the doc-
trine to “insulate” (i.e., protect) New Deal agencies from judicial re-
view.74 Insulating agencies allowed them to implement New Deal goals 
freely, with essentially no limitations.75 Professor Daniel Ho and Erica 
                                                                                                                      
70 See Daniel E. Ho & Erica L. Ross, Did Liberal Justices Invent the Standing Doctrine? An Em-
pirical Study of the Evolution of Standing, 1921–2006, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 591, 594 (2010) (“Indeed, 
even the most basic question of the origins of the standing doctrine eludes scholars.”); 
Pushaw, supra note 2, at 396 (“[C]ommentators have failed to provide a rigorous theory of 
justiciability built upon the founders’ ideas.”). 
71 262 U.S. 447, 485–86 (1923). 
72 264 U.S. at 267–68; see, e.g., Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private Ac-
tions, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 255, 262 (1961) (stating that the Court first articulated its standing 
doctrine in Chicago Junction); Nancy C. Staudt, Modeling Standing, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 612, 
622 (2004) (arguing that the Court first articulated standing in Frothingham); Cass R. Sun-
stein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 2071, 2072 & n.1 (1990) 
(discussing the early history of standing in the New Deal era). 
73 Professors Steven Winter and Cass Sunstein originally proposed the idea. See Sun-
stein, What’s Standing?, supra note 5, at 179–81 (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 
(1905)) (arguing that the Supreme Court originally created the doctrine to prevent lower 
courts that followed a Lochner favoritism of economic interests from allowing plaintiffs to 
interfere with New Deal programs); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public 
Law, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1432, 1436–38 (1988) ; Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing 
and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 1371, 1456–57 (1988). Now, this thesis is 
widely accepted as the prevailing justification for the standing doctrine. See, e.g., Maxwell L. 
Stearns, Standing and Social Choice: Historical Evidence, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 309, 366 & n.174 
(1995); Steven L. Winter, The Meaning of “Under Color of” Law, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 323, 333 
n.48 (1992). But note that some, such as Professor Robert Pushaw, believe that the doc-
trine’s current use mostly facilitates judicial control (or screening) of court dockets. See 
Pushaw, supra note 3, at 10 n.42. 
74 See, e.g., Ho & Ross, supra note 70, at 594–95. Professor Daniel Ho and Erica Ross 
note the unique effect that this insulating prerogative may have accidentally caused: rather 
than keeping public interest litigation out of the courts, it essentially entrenched “the lib-
eral New Deal administrative state.” See id. at 595. 
75 See id. at 597–98 (explaining that liberal justices believed administrative agencies 
could best address the economic turmoil of the 1920s and 1930s). Until recently, though 
generally accepted among scholars, the thesis was merely speculation based on historical 
records and case law of the early 1900s. See id. at 595. Professor Ho and Ross “provide[] the 
first systematic empirical confirmation for the insulation thesis.” Id. at 647. 
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Ross conclude that standing existed without contest among conserva-
tive and liberal judges prior to the period of insulation, but that em-
pirical evidence suggests that New Deal insulation played a significant 
role in crafting the modern doctrine.76 The minority view is that stand-
ing originated—and continues to arise out of—a need for judicial 
docket management, purely as a matter of efficiency.77 Some adherents 
of the insulation thesis, however, believe that docket management is 
present but is a secondary factor in standing’s development.78 
 The difference between the insulation thesis and the docket-
management theory is subtle, but fundamental. The docket-manage-
ment theory (a synonym for “judicial efficiency”) implicitly views stand-
ing as a screening mechanism, focusing on the number of plaintiffs be-
fore the court, through which certain plaintiffs are screened by the 
gatekeepers of justice (i.e., the courts).79 On the other hand, the insula-
tion thesis implicitly views standing as a channeling function, in that it 
focuses on the nature of the plaintiffs seeking relief before the court.80 
The insulation view seeks to funnel all potential plaintiffs through cer-
tain procedural mechanisms that in turn create consistency in standing 
rulings and certainty in the minds of the plaintiffs. This “channels” the 
citizen-plaintiffs, and those that come out the other side represent the 
most egregiously harmed plaintiffs. That is essentially what standing 
seeks to accomplish—producing plaintiffs whose harms are personal to 
                                                                                                                      
76 Id. at 648. Professor Ho and Ross’s article presents some interesting conclusions 
from these early pre-insulation empirical findings: 
[T]he early animators of the standing doctrine themselves assumed their deci-
sions would have some precedential effect on the lower courts and future Justices. 
While the doctrine certainly appears to be used strategically around the time of 
the New Deal to insulate agencies . . . . [o]ur data show that the doctrine . . . 
does not speak to any strong notion that standing is all politics. 
Id. (emphasis added). But the analysis does not preclude a stronger docket-management 
thesis because the evidence suggests that the doctrine did exist before the New Deal. See id. 
77 See, e.g., Pushaw, supra note 3, at 10 n.42. As Professor Pushaw notes: 
I have long maintained that this need for docket control has been a major 
impetus behind the development of standing doctrine. The Court, however, 
has been reluctant to mention this concern explicitly, likely fearing that doing 
so would be condemned as an illegitimate policy decision that contradicts its 
long-standing position that Congress has absolute control over federal juris-
diction. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
78 See, e.g., Ho & Ross, supra note 70, at 648. 
79 See Pushaw, supra note 3, at 10 n.42. 
80 See Ho & Ross, supra note 70, at 594–96. 
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them.81 But with such confusing and conflicted judicial decisions, the 
practical realities of standing in the administrative age simply do not 
intersect with the theoretical purposes the doctrine claims to support.82 
Screening mechanisms are inherently susceptible to political bias, stere-
otyping, and inappropriate grouping, and this approach to standing has 
made the doctrine more controversial than it otherwise would be. 
 The key difference between the two theories and the concomitant 
problems they theoretically displace rests in the nature of the problems 
they solve. If the problem standing seeks to address is that too many 
plaintiffs permeate the judicial system, then standing remedies that 
through a screening function (the judicial efficiency theory). If, how-
ever, the problem is the nature of the plaintiffs, then standing remedies 
that through a channeling mechanism (the insulation theory). Viewing 
standing as a channeling mechanism, as opposed to a screening device, 
is the underlying premise of our thesis. 
 The idea that administrative agencies should define standing also 
comports with the channeling view. Historically, standing channeled 
implementation and enforcement of progressive legislation to agencies 
with the appropriate expertise and organizational mission. Similarly, 
agencies can draw upon that knowledge and specialized expertise to 
channel private citizen suits through the most appropriate plaintiffs— 
those who best represent the public interest. Unfortunately, modern 
courts have increasingly used standing as a screening mechanism to 
limit the number of suits, rather than as a mechanism to channel pub-
lic interest suits to the best plaintiffs.83 From a policy perspective, such 
channeling requires the type of expertise found in agencies rather than 
courts, which of course was the justification for the insulation thesis in 
the first place. 
B. The Modern Doctrine 
 Arguably, in Lujan the Supreme Court set out an unattainable test 
for plaintiffs litigating under citizen suit provisions.84 Climate change 
                                                                                                                      
81 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[T]he party bringing suit 
must show that the action injures him in a concrete and personal way.”). 
82 Compare Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 516--26 (holding that Massachusetts had a per-
sonal stake in the outcome of a genuine controversy, and therefore had standing to sue), 
with id. at 535 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the standing doctrine ensures judi-
cial restraint and thereby promotes the separation of powers). 
83 See Pushaw, supra note 3, at 10 n.42. 
84 See, e.g., Sunstein, What’s Standing?, supra note 5, at 165–67. 
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forced the Court to address the standing analysis in a new context.85 
Several state attorneys general, local governments, and private litigants 
sought to compel the EPA to declare, through rulemaking proceedings, 
that carbon dioxide emissions from new motor vehicles were an “air pol-
lutant” under Section 202 of the Clean Air Act,86 and in turn craft regu-
lations that would place limitations on those emissions.87 The EPA had 
refused to act88 and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit de-
nied review on appeal; however, the Supreme Court granted the peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari.89 
 The plaintiffs’ standing was the first contested issue in Massachu-
setts.90 The Court distinguished states from normal litigants for the pur-
poses of standing by giving special deference to Massachusetts.91 The 
risk of actual and imminent harm because of global warming was inten-
sified by the threat of “rising seas . . . swallow[ing] Massachusetts’[s] 
coastal land.”92 The State’s particularized injury derived from its capac-
ity as a landowner.93 As the sea level continues rising, the documented 
severity of injury to the state increases.94 Although the injury techni-
cally arises in the future, had the EPA continued its strategy of regula-
tory delay, a concrete and imminent injury would result.95 Further, the 
State demonstrated a causal connection from the coastline injuries to 
the claimed source of those injuries (carbon dioxide emissions) be-
                                                                                                                      
85 Cf. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518–23 (holding that the plaintiffs had standing to sue 
over a future injury). 
86 See id. at 532. 
87 See id. at 510–12. 
88 See Notice of Denial of Petition for Rulemaking, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,925–31 
(Sept. 8, 2003) (explaining that the EPA questioned whether the Clean Air Act authorized 
the agency to issue regulations addressing global climate change and that political pres-
sures from both sides of the issue led the agency to conclude that regulation “was not ap-
propriate at this time”). 
89 Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 548 U.S. 903, 903 
(2006). 
90 See 549 U.S. at 520--30. The Court took a narrow approach to reviewing the D.C. 
Circuit’s standing decision, holding that only one of the plaintiffs must establish standing 
for the Court to review the case. See id. at 518 (citing Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & 
Inst. Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 52 & n.2 (2006)). 
91 See id. at 519 (“That Massachusetts does in fact own a great deal of the ‘territory al-
leged to be affected’ only reinforces the conclusion that its stake in the outcome of this 
case is sufficiently concrete to warrant the exercise of federal judicial power.”). 
92 See id. at 522 (noting the importance of the fact that Massachusetts owned a substan-
tial portion of coastal lands). 
93 Id. 
94 See id. at 522–23. 
95 See id. at 525. 
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cause the emissions at least contributed to the harms alleged.96 The 
Court’s remedial powers could provide the State relief as well, because 
although regulating motor vehicle emissions would not completely re-
verse the effects of global warming, the Court can compel the EPA to 
“slow or reduce” it if necessary.97 
 As to the merits of the case, the Court concluded that the EPA 
must either regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehi-
cles or decide the emissions are not pollutants.98 The Court interpreted 
Section 202 of the Clean Air Act to provide the EPA with statutory au-
thority to regulate carbon dioxide emissions and ruled that the EPA’s 
arguments held no weight against the statutory text.99 After the conclu-
sion of Massachusetts, the EPA released an endangerment finding100 and 
initiated a mandate to regulate carbon dioxide emissions potentially 
contributing to global warming.101 
 The decision’s most logical outcome grants standing to state attor-
neys general litigating against federal agencies.102 Over time, the role of 
a state attorney general has shifted from a counsel for the executive 
branch to the “people’s lawyer.”103 The powers granted to state attor-
neys general reach much farther than simple citizen protection: the 
                                                                                                                      
96 549 U.S. at 523. The Court explained that regardless of how large or small, automo-
bile emissions at least “contribute” to the injury, and thus the EPA should regulate those 
contributions. See id. at 523–24. 
97 Id. at 525 (citing Larson, 456 U.S. at 244 & n.15) (satisfying redressability). 
98 Id. at 532. The Court held that if the EPA believes that carbon dioxide gases cause 
no harm to the atmosphere, then the “EPA must say so.” Id. at 534. 
99 Id. at 532–33 (refusing to allow the EPA to attempt to avoid its statutory obligation 
to regulate dangerous emissions). 
100 See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under 
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009). 
101 See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring 
Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 14,226, 14,226 ( June, 3 2010) (Tailoring Rule); Light-Duty Vehicle 
Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 75 
Fed. Reg. 25,324, 25,324 (May 7, 2010) (Tailpipe Rule); Reconsideration of Interpretation 
of Regulations That Determine Pollutants Covered by Clean Air Act Permitting Programs, 
75 Fed. Reg. 17,004, 17,004 (Apr. 2, 2010) (Timing Rule). The combined effect of these 
agency actions—the Endangerment Finding, the Tailoring Rule, the Tailpipe Rule, and 
the Timing Rule—makes greenhouse gases subject to the Prevention of Significant Dete-
rioration (PSD) Program. See Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 
133–36 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (concluding that Congress intended the PSD program to combat 
precisely the type of harms caused by greenhouse gases). 
102 See Dru Stevenson, Special Solicitude for State Standing: Massachusetts v. EPA, 112 
Penn St. L. Rev. 1, 37 (2007). 
103 Id. at 39. That the state attorney general now represents the people is further evi-
denced by the fact that forty-three states currently elect their attorney general. See About 
NAAG, Nat’l Ass’n of Att’ys Gen., http://www.naag.org/about_naag.php (last visited 
Aug. 24, 2012). 
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state attorney general position affords the citizens of a particular state a 
method of influencing national policy.104 Additionally, because the 
Court rejected the EPA’s refusal to regulate, the decision points to the 
implicit contrast with previous decisions where the Court customarily 
granted judicial deference to agency decisions.105 The question re-
mained, however, whether standing as described in Massachusetts in-
cluded private organizations, such as special interest groups.106 The 
conclusion follows that for standing, interest groups have inferior posi-
tioning to state attorneys general.107 That would end this discussion, 
had the Second Circuit not issued a puzzling discussion on standing 
two years later.108 
C. Standing’s Role in Public Interest Litigation 
 The modern trend of standing decisions indicates a liberalization 
of the standing doctrine.109 This facilitates increasingly aggressive pub-
lic interest litigation through citizen suit provisions.110 We take a mod-
erate stance on the relative value of public interest litigation.111 Never-
theless, in light of cases such as American Electric that illustrate the 
Court’s presumable willingness to uphold standing for a private plain-
tiff,112 public interest litigation will soon present a practical, unman-
ageable problem to which we propose a minimalist, but feasible, solu-
tion that could channel several positive externalities. 
                                                                                                                      
104 See Stevenson, supra note 102, at 40 (noting that electing an attorney general “al-
lows voters an alternative method of influencing national policy”). Indeed, such an em-
powering new role for a state attorney general could have a democratizing effect. See id. at 
40–41. Although this could create inefficiency, it could also promote checks and balances. 
See id. at 41. 
105 See id. at 74 (“This distinction further tips the scales towards the states, who not only 
have assurances of standing, but also have an invitation to compel federal agencies to regu-
late new areas where they have been previously silent.”). 
106 See, e.g., id. at 50 (“Activist groups . . . may find that they have a diminished role for 
litigation against federal agencies in light of the special solicitude rule.”). 
107 Id. 
108 See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 332--49 (2d Cir. 2009), rev’d on 
other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) (plurality opinion deferring to the Second Circuit’s 
determination on standing). 
109 We propose, as others have agreed, that the doctrine will continue down this path. 
See infra notes 122--154 and accompanying text. 
110 See Pushaw, supra note 3, at 32 (noting this rise in public interest litigation). 
111 Cf. Daniel P. Kessler, Introduction to Regulation Versus Litigation: Perspectives 
from Economics and Law 3 (Daniel P. Kessler ed., 2011) (“[T]he use of litigation as a 
means to force companies to accept regulation outside of the normal political process 
raised several new questions about litigation’s dynamic costs and benefits.”). 
112 See infra notes 148--154 and accompanying text. 
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 Citizen suits are a subset of a larger movement of public interest 
litigation.113 The common law developed during a time when society 
was more rural and decentralized, and individual property rights were 
the foundation of our legal system. In a milieu focused on personal 
property rights and disputes between individual parties, it makes sense 
to have lawsuit entry requirements that ensure the plaintiff’s personal 
stake or property interest in the claim.114 Public interests have greater 
importance in modern politics due to urbanization, globalization, and 
infrastructured society.115 Apart from institutional competency prob-
lems (i.e., avoiding courts issuing declaratory judgments or settling po-
litical questions), historical standing requirements helped guarantee 
that plaintiffs would have the incentive to prosecute a claim properly, 
and that parties did not bring claims with first-order impacts on other 
individuals’ personal property rights.116 
                                                                                                                      
113 See infra notes 155--299 and accompanying text. 
114 See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[T]he party bringing 
suit must show that the action injures him in a concrete and personal way.”). 
115 See Rebecca M. Bratspies, Regulatory Trust, 51 Ariz. L. Rev. 575, 591–92 (2009) 
(“Urbanization and industrialization meant that individuals and local communities devel-
oped an ever-widening circle of interaction. With formerly insulated groups interacting 
while also remaining distanced, social relations became more contingent.” (footnote omit-
ted)); Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical Legal Consciousness and Trans-
formative Politics, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 937, 942 (2007) (“[E]xtralegal strategies . . . imply path 
dependency with current economic realities and shifting commitments of the state in an 
era of globalization.”); see also Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Fourth-Generation Environ-
mental Law: Integrationist and Multimodal, 35 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 771, 784–
85 (2011) (“The potential for environmental law change . . . depend[s] on the complex 
interactions of politics, economic behavior, limited resources, social forces such as global-
ization and mass culture, psychological phenomena such as bounded rationality and use of 
heuristics, physical and ecological conditions and processes, unexpected events (e.g., disas-
ters), the iterative nature of American society’s environmental ethics pluralism, and other 
influences on environmental law.”); Dave Owen, Urbanization, Water Quality, and the Regu-
lated Landscape, 82 U. Colo. L. Rev. 431, 435 (2011) (discussing political solutions to im-
proving the controls on storm water pollution); cf. George S. McGraw, Defining and Defend-
ing the Right to Water and Its Minimum Core: Legal Construction and the Role of National 
Jurisprudence, 8 Loy. U. Chi. Int’l L. Rev. 127, 128 (2011) (“Urbanization, explosive con-
sumption and resource pollution have forced human society to devise ever more ingenious 
ways to extract, treat and store water.”); Richard C. Schragger, Mobile Capital, Local Economic 
Regulation, and the Democratic City, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 482, 539 (2009) (“[G]lobalization has 
narrowed the options available to nation-states, providing some political and economic 
room for smaller-scale governments to regulate.”). 
116 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“This requirement is not just 
an empty formality. It preserves the vitality of the adversarial process by assuring both that 
the parties before the court have an actual, as opposed to professed, stake in the outcome, 
and that the legal questions presented . . . will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere 
of a debating society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation 
of the consequences of judicial action.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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 The modern era brought changes to this legal landscape. Urbani-
zation has made citizens’ legal interests overlap, and sometimes collide, 
much more than in previous eras;117 globalization and technical ad-
vances have similarly increased individuals’ connectivity.118 As a result, 
collective legal rights—the public interest—can create a demand for 
legal redress that would have been largely unknown in the common law 
era.119 The public interest is arguably a more valid legal concern today 
than it was a century ago, when many of our procedural protocols, in-
cluding standing requirements, first evolved.120 Public interest litiga-
tion, whether in the form of citizen suits, class actions, or attorney gen-
eral claims, now constitutes an important share of court dockets in the 
United States, and the rules for standing have become antiquated and 
unworkable.121 There is an urgent need for updated eligibility rules for 
plaintiffs bringing citizen suits, and the relevant administrative agencies 
are in the best position to bring the necessary subtlety to this area. 
II. Standing in American Electric 
 The 2011 U.S. Supreme Court case, American Electric Power Co. v. 
Connecticut, involved a group of defendants122 that the plaintiffs123 
claimed were “the five largest emitters of carbon dioxide in the United 
                                                                                                                      
117 See Lobel, supra note 115, at 942. 
118 See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Con-
temporary Legal Thought, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 342, 385–87 (2004) (noting how information 
technology has facilitated greater public participation in social and legal debates); Charles 
F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 
Harv. L. Rev. 1015, 1019 (2004) (stating that experimentalist regulation has promoted 
“ongoing stakeholder participation and measured accountability”). 
119 See E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of 
Environmental Law, 1 J.L. Econ. & Org. 313, 314–17 (1985). 
120 See Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Law: The Movement at Midlife, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 
2027, 2028 (2008) (discussing how the capacities of public interest law have increased as 
the problems it seeks to address have multiplied). 
121 Cf. Mark Seidenfeld & Janna Satz Nugent, “The Friendship of the People”: Citizen Par-
ticipation in Environmental Enforcement, 73 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 269, 286–87 (2005) (noting 
that public interest groups file a substantial number of citizen suits). 
122 The defendants that petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court included four private 
companies (American Electric Power Company, Inc.; Southern Company; Xcel Energy 
Inc.; and Cinergy Corporation), and the Tennessee Valley Authority (a government-owned 
corporation that operates several fossil fuel-fired power plants in various states). See Am. 
Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2534 & n.5 (2011). 
123 The plaintiffs included eight states (California, Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, New 
York, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin), the City of New York, and a group of three 
nonprofit trusts (Open Space Institute, Inc.; Open Space Conservancy, Inc.; and the 
Audubon Society of New Hampshire). See id. at 2533–34 & nn.3–4. 
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States.”124 The plaintiffs’ assertions, however, differed from those con-
sidered by the Court in 2007 in Massachusetts v. EPA; the plaintiffs in 
American Electric asserted that the defendants’ carbon dioxide emissions 
violated federal common law public nuisance protections.125 
 On appeal, the Supreme Court considered whether the plaintiffs 
could maintain federal common law nuisance claims against carbon 
dioxide emitters, ultimately deciding the nuisance claim 8--0 in favor of 
American Electric because a future EPA regulation displaces any federal 
common law right to seek a remedy for carbon dioxide emissions.126 
Unlike the issues of displacement and preemption, on which the jus-
tices generally agreed, an issue of contention among the justices in-
volved the question of whether New York City, the States, and the pri-
vate plaintiffs had standing.127 The deciding eight justices split on the 
issue of standing in an ambiguous four-sentence paragraph.128 
 Thus, although the Supreme Court overturned the Second Cir-
cuit’s decision as to nuisance in American Electric, the Court’s split left 
the Second Circuit’s decision on standing intact.129 The Second Circuit 
                                                                                                                      
 
124 See id. at 2534 (“[The defendants’] collective annual emissions of 650 million tons 
constitute 25 percent of emissions from the domestic electric power sector, 10 percent of 
emissions from all domestic human activities, and 2.5 percent of all anthropogenic emis-
sions worldwide.” (citation omitted)). 
125 Compare Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 510–11 (2007) (discussing the plain-
tiff’s assertion that the EPA could not deny the petition for rulemaking to regulate the 
emission of greenhouse gases from motor vehicles under the Clean Air Act), with Am. Elec. 
Power Co., 131 S. Ct. 2533–34 (seeking abatement of the defendants’ ongoing contributions 
to global warming). 
126 Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2537. Justice Sonia Sotomayor did not take part in 
the Supreme Court’s consideration of the case because she had heard the matter while on 
the Second Circuit. See id. at 2540. 
127 See id. at 2535. 
128 See id. The four-sentence paragraph gave no indication of the Court’s future inten-
tions on standing, nor did it indicate which justices voted for or against standing; the latter 
is particularly unusual. See id. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg may have given a clue as to how 
the split emerged through her use of “adhered,” noting that four justices “adhered to the 
dissenting views in Massachusetts v. EPA.” See Martinned, Comment to Supreme Court Unan-
imous That Clean Air Act Displaces Climate Suits, Volokh Conspiracy ( June 20, 2011, 2:04 
PM), http://volokh.com/2011/06/20/supreme-court-unanimous-that-clean-air-act-displaces- 
climate-suits/. Also, Justice Samuel Alito peculiarly wrote a single-sentence concurrence 
joined by Justice Clarence Thomas. See Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2540–41 (Alito, J., 
concurring); see also Jonathan H. Adler, Supreme Court Unanimous That Clean Air Act Dis-
places Climate Suits, Volokh Conspiracy ( June 20, 2011, 10:45 AM), http://volokh.com/ 
2011/06/20/supreme-court-unanimous-that-clean-air-act-displaces-climate-suits/ (noting 
Justice Antonin Scalia and Chief Justice John Roberts’s potential strategy to limit the Mas-
sachusetts standing decision by not joining Justice Alito’s concurrence). 
129 See Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2535. Correspondingly, although the Supreme 
Court’s decision holds great importance to this Article, the substantive standing analysis 
comes from the Second Circuit’s opinion. See id.; Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 
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clearly meant to take the analysis a step beyond Massachusetts. In Massa-
chusetts, the Supreme Court avoided the standing analysis for the pri-
vate conservation groups.130 In American Electric, however, the Second 
Circuit tackled the question head on, holding that the trusts sufficiently 
alleged facts that proved standing.131 
A. Standing for the Private Plaintiffs 
 The Second Circuit’s American Electric decision focused on the fu-
ture injury to the ecological value of the properties132 owned by the 
trusts.133 Petitioners claimed that these diminishing harms undermined 
their ability to promote legitimate goals with the properties: to preserve 
land for use and enjoyment, and for scientific and educational pur-
poses.134 The defendants argued that these injuries constituted future 
injuries, and not the kind of injuries that could fairly be characterized 
as imminent.135 
 In American Electric, the Second Circuit turned to the definition of 
“imminent” applied by the Supreme Court in its 1992 decision in Lujan 
v. Defenders of Wildlife.136 In Lujan, the Court interpreted the term as not 
imposing a strict temporal requirement that a future injury occur with-
in a particular period after a complaint is filed.137 The Second Circuit 
echoed these sentiments, holding that the plaintiffs’ arguments indi-
cated that the certainty of the future injury—as opposed to a mere hy-
pothetical international travel that will happen soon as in Lujan— con-
fers standing.138 The emissions that contributed to the harms would 
                                                                                                                      
F.3d 309, 332--49 (2d Cir. 2009) (plurality opinion on standing), rev’d on other grounds, 131 
S. Ct. 2527 (2011). 
130 See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518 (stressing the special position of Massachusetts). 
131 See Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 349. 
132 The properties included lands owned by the trusts or lands held in conservation 
easements. See id. at 342. 
133 Id. Similar to Massachusetts, the trusts argued that the rising sea levels caused by 
global warming, to which the defendants’ emissions contributed, harmed properties along 
the coasts and tidal rivers. See id. 
134 Id. 
135 See id. at 342–43. 
136 See id. at 343 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 & n.2 (1992)); 
cf. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that the claimed “injury must 
be real and immediate” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
137 504 U.S. at 564 & n.2. 
138 Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 343 (citing Clinton v. City of New York, 542 U.S. 417, 
459 (1998)); see Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 641 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that the plain-
tiff had standing at the motion to dismiss stage even though the medical harm was merely 
“anticipated”). 
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continue, and only worsen as time went on, until the injuries mani-
fested into a complete diminution in property value.139 
 The causation—the nexus between the alleged harms and the al-
leged acts of the defendants—was that the defendants allegedly 
amounted to the “five largest emitters of carbon dioxide in the United 
States.”140 Expanding on this, the plaintiff-States argued that the de-
fendants’ emissions “directly and proximately contribute to their inju-
ries and threatened injuries.”141 The defendants relied on an argument 
attributing pollution harm to its source; however, the Court had re-
jected that argument two years prior in Massachusetts.142 Instead, the 
Second Circuit explained that simply proving that the defendants con-
tributed to the pollution sufficed to show that the defendants’ acts con-
tributed to the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries, and as such, the defendant 
may not escape liability by requiring a special burden of proof to estab-
lish standing.143 A plaintiff does not have to sue every defendant poten-
tially causing their injuries; the pollution of a single defendant can jus-
tify causation of at least some part of a plaintiff’s injuries.144 
                                                                                                                     
 The plaintiffs argued that a court could redress the harms caused 
by the defendants’ substantial emissions of carbon dioxide into the at-
mosphere by capping the defendants’ emissions to a specific percent-
age each year for at least a decade.145 The defendants countered that 
the plaintiffs could not prove that capping the defendants’ emissions by 
an unidentified percentage would redress the harms the plaintiffs 
sought to delay.146 The American Electric court held, however, that causa-
tion was established because “[p]laintiffs have sued [d]efendants who, 
they allege, are directly causing them injury.”147 
 
139 See Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 344. 
140 See id. at 345 (citation omitted). 
141 Id. Contributing to an ongoing problem such as global warming can suffice as an 
injury for standing. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 521. 
142 See Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 345–46 (rejecting the elevated traceability burden 
advocated by the defendants and applying the common law causation standard for indi-
visible harm). 
143 See id. at 345–46. 
144 See, e.g., Pub. Interest Research Grp. of N.J., Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals Inc., 
913 F.2d 64, 72 & n.8 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing United States v. Students Challenging Regula-
tory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14 (1973)). 
145 Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 347–48. 
146 See id. at 348; cf. Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 45–46 (1976) 
(holding that the Court cannot redress harms from an independent, third-party source). 
147 See Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 348 (emphasis added). 
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B. The Plurality Problem: Where Do the Nine Justices Stand? 
 Justice Sonia Sotomayor recused herself from the Supreme Court’s 
consideration of American Electric, as she had taken part in the Second 
Circuit’s review of the case.148 The remaining eight justices split evenly 
on the standing issue.149 Arguably, the continued “liberalization” of 
standing hinges on what Justice Sotomayor would decide, as her vote 
will break the tie on standing.150 
 In her short time on the Supreme Court, Justice Sotomayor has 
voted twice with the liberal block of the Court on the issue of stand-
ing.151 In 2011 in Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, 
she voted along with Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, 
and Elena Kagan in favor of standing.152 And in 2010 in Salazar v. 
Buono, Justice Sotomayor joined a dissenting opinion, along with Jus-
tices Ginsburg and John Paul Stevens, rejecting Justice Antonin Scalia’s 
arguments against standing.153 In sum, if Justice Sotomayor had voted, 
it appears that a five-justice majority would have favored standing in 
American Electric.154 When similar cases arise in the future, and all the 
justices can vote, this majority will likely prevail, despite the opposition 
from Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Scalia, Clarence Thomas, 
and Samuel Alito. 
III. Agency-Created Standing Requirements for Citizen Suits 
 The definitions for standing to bring citizen suits can, and should, 
come from the administrative agencies entrusted with primary en-
forcement of the same laws or regulations. The arguments in favor of 
this position are partly descriptive and statutory—describing Congress’s 
                                                                                                                      
148 Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct at 2540. 
149 Id. at 2535. 
150 See id. at 2535, 2540. 
151 See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1450 (2011) (Kagan & 
Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting); Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1830 n.2 (2010) (Ginsburg, 
Stevens, & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting). 
152 131 S. Ct. at 1450 (Kagan & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting) (arguing in favor of stand-
ing in a taxpayer suit alleging that Arizona’s tuition tax credit violated the Establishment 
Clause). 
153 130 S. Ct. at 1830 n.2 (Ginsburg, Stevens, & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting) (agreeing 
with the plurality that the plaintiff had standing to allege that the public display of a Latin 
cross in a national park violated the Establishment Clause). Justice Stephen Breyer also 
dissented in Salazar. See id. at 1843 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“For the same reason, we must 
here assume that the plaintiff originally had standing to bring the lawsuit.”). 
154 See Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct at 2540; Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org., 131 S. Ct. at 
1450 (Kagan & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting); Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1830 n.2 (Ginsburg, Ste-
vens, & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting). 
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implicit delegation of authority to the agencies to promulgate rules on 
this point—and partly normative, arguing that the agencies have the 
most expertise and best information to craft such rules.155 Besides argu-
ing that agencies are a particularly appropriate source of guidance on 
this point, we also provide reasons for the urgency of extrajudicial in-
put on issues of standing—the current trend toward judicial acquies-
cence, the proliferation of citizen-suit statutes, and the increasing mar-
ket share of public interest litigation in our legal system overall.156 This 
Part will also attempt to anticipate and answer substantial objections to 
our thesis.157 
A. Congress’s Authority to Define Standing and to Delegate Its Authority 
 The text of Article III,158 and the nontextual separation-of-powers 
doctrine,159 furnished part of the basis for the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
early jurisprudence on standing—the doctrine kept courts from creep-
ing too close to legislative functions by, for instance, issuing declaratory 
judgments or answering political questions.160 The original idea was 
not to limit Congress, but rather to limit the courts from stepping in 
where Congress had declined to act.161 Eventually, of course, some 
commentators interpreted the doctrine as a pushback from the courts 
against Congress, cabining Congress from conscripting “the courts in 
its battles with the executive branch.”162 
                                                                                                                     
 Yet most academic commentary up to now has focused on Con-
gress’s ability to expand standing,163 when the statutes in question al-
ready had the broadest possible language permitting parties to sue, 
 
155 See infra notes 158–237 and accompanying text. 
156 See infra notes 238–246 and accompanying text. 
157 See infra notes 247–299 and accompanying text. 
158 U.S. Const. art. III. 
159 See John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 
1939, 1971–73 (2011) (discussing how no one overarching theory of separation of powers 
can explain all constitutional provisions and thus concluding that each provision should 
be interpreted at a retail level). 
160 See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 2, at 894. 
161 See id. at 882–83. 
162 Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 459, 463 (2008); see also 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576--77 (1992) (noting that the concrete in-
jury requirement prevents Congress from transferring executive power to the courts); 
Scalia, supra note 2, at 894--97 (arguing that the doctrine of standing properly restricts 
courts to their traditional role of protecting minority rather than majority rights). 
163 See, e.g., supra note 5 (summarizing scholarly perspectives). 
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(i.e., “any person”).164 Congress left the standing question completely 
open in these statutes; this left courts to navigate without direction and 
created confusion in the academic literature—how can we argue about 
the farthest limits of congressional expansion in the area, when Con-
gress begins statutes with the most inclusive terminology available? Our 
argument takes the discussion in a countervailing direction: whether 
Congress could add language limiting who can sue, or excluding cer-
tain parties as plaintiffs if their connection to the claim seems too at-
tenuated. This idea is certainly less controversial than speculations 
about whether Congress’s power to authorize suits is infinite. Congres-
sional restrictions on standing present no separation-of-powers con-
cerns or other constitutional issues, assuming that the restrictions do 
not present a genuine due process violation or infringe on Seventh 
Amendment rights.165 
 Congress has simply remained silent in federal citizen suit provi-
sions, and on standing in general.166 Rather than viewing the “any per-
son” language of citizen-suit provisions as maximally expansive, it seems 
more reasonable to read the language as perfectly minimal in terms of 
guidance about the legally appropriate plaintiffs for a given citizen 
suit.167 Congress simply left the question unanswered—a gap in the law. 
 Congress could have answered the question; it would have been 
within its powers to do so.168 For starters, Congress could have left out 
the citizen-suit provision completely, leaving no opportunity to sue. 
Under the public rights doctrine, citizen suits best resemble public 
rights rather than private rights;169 and what Congress giveth, Congress 
                                                                                                                      
 
164 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2006); see also 33 U.S.C § 1365(a) (2006) (“[A]ny citi-
zen may commence a civil action on his own behalf . . . .”). 
165 See U.S. Const. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law . . . .”); id. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law . . . the 
right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .”); id. amend. XIV (“No State shall . . . deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”). Some legislative 
assignments of common law claims to bankruptcy courts through pendent or ancillary 
jurisdiction have, according to the Court, violated the Seventh Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution. See, e.g., Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2615 (2011) (“The ‘experts’ in the 
federal system at resolving common law counterclaims such as [the defendant’s] are the 
Article III courts . . . .”). 
166 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a). 
167 See id. 
168 See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that Congress has 
the power to define injury and causation). 
169 See, e.g., F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 Cornell L. 
Rev. 275, 276–77 (2008) (“[A] desire to limit private individuals’ ability to invoke the judi-
ciary to vindicate public rights has motivated the Court to limit the types of factual injuries 
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can taketh away. Further, each of the statutes themselves limits the citi-
zen suits to the scope of the relevant act (such as the Clean Air Act).170 
Congress can impose a wide variety of other limitations on the right to 
sue under these enactments: statutes of limitations, notice require-
ments or similar time constraints,171 limitations on forum or venue 
(such as giving original jurisdiction to the D.C. Circuit),172 or requiring 
agency acquiescence to the suit (such as the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission’s “right to sue” letters).173 Congress forbids the 
suits when the agency has already commenced enforcement.174 Even if 
Congress has not yet exercised its power to define the eligibility for po-
tential plaintiffs, it seems undeniable that Congress could further de-
limit the injury-in-fact and chain of causation that would suffice for 
standing. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the Supreme Court has sug-
gested, and many commentators concur, that Congress can define 
some limitations on standing for citizen suits, at least within reason.175 
 Given this seemingly easy premise, it follows that Congress can 
delegate authority to the appropriate government agencies to propose 
and adopt the guidelines for those cases over which the agency already 
has primary enforcement authority. Congress has already delegated to 
the applicable agencies the power to promulgate regulations,176 to 
spend funds on research and monitoring compliance,177 and to bring 
enforcement actions.178 
                                                                                                                      
that support standing. According to the Court, private individuals may invoke the judiciary 
only to resolve their private disputes.”). 
170 E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1)–(3) (limiting the provision’s applicability to the Clean 
Air Act). 
171 See, e.g., id. § 7604(b)(1)(A) (requiring that a plaintiff provide notice to the EPA, 
the State, and to any alleged violator of the Clean Air Act sixty days prior to commence-
ment of any suit). 
172 See, e.g., id. § 7413(d)(4); id. § 7524(c)(5). 
173 See id. § 2000e-5(f)(1). 
174 See id. § 7604(b)(1)(B). 
175 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring); supra note 5 and accompany-
ing text (summarizing scholarly commentary recommending that Congress act on Justice 
Anthony Kennedy’s suggestions in Lujan). 
176 For example, Congress has required the EPA to publish regulations in a number of 
areas. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1) (to define pollutants); id. § 7408(f)(1) (to regulate 
the transportation of pollutants); id. § 7409(a)(1) (to define air-quality standards); id. 
§ 7411(b)(1)(A) (to list stationary sources). 
177 See, e.g., id. § 7403(a)–(b) (research); id. § 7403(c) (monitoring). 
178 See, e.g., id. § 7413 (federal enforcement). 
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B. Implied Delegation 
 Not only could Congress delegate to agencies the task of defining 
standing for citizen suits, but arguably it already has. The statutory si-
lence on this issue presumably leaves a gap for the agency itself to fill, 
especially within the context of a larger enactment conferring broad 
discretionary powers on an agency. 
 Congress typically delegates authority with broad, general authori-
zations, giving an agency power to promulgate regulations, to conduct 
research or require reporting (information gathering), to monitor 
compliance, to bring enforcement actions, and to conduct adjudicative 
tribunals or hearings.179 Specific or express provisions are the excep-
tion, not the rule. There are a few areas, such as subpoena powers, 
where courts have historically required “express authorization” in the 
agency’s organic statute,180 but normally the opposite is true—agencies 
function within broad authorizations and have nearly unfettered discre-
tion within those general guidelines.181 In other words, Congress more 
often delegates authority by what it does not say than by what it speci-
es.
                                                                                                                     
fi 182 
 The doctrine of judicial deference to agency interpretations of law, 
which was established in the Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., rests on the idea that 
 
179 See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (holding that Congress 
may constitutionally “delegate power under broad general directives”); Heather K. Gerken, 
Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 37–39 (2010) (noting that 
“[a]dministrators often have a great deal of discretion in carrying out their duties”); Gary 
Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1231, 1240--41 (1994) 
(arguing that numerous federal statutes delegate broad policymaking power to administra-
tive agencies). 
180 See, e.g., United States v. Sec. State Bank & Trust, 473 F.2d 638, 641 (5th Cir. 1973); 
see also Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 485 (1894), overruled by 
Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968) (“[T]he power to impose fine or imprisonment in 
order to compel the performance of a legal duty imposed by the United States can only be 
exerted, under the law of the land, by a competent judicial tribunal having jurisdiction in 
the premises.” (citation omitted)). 
181 See, e.g., Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 593–94 (2004) (hold-
ing that courts may interpret congressional silence consistent with the provisions of the 
relevant statute). 
182 See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Reclaiming the Legal Fiction of Congressional Delegation, 
97 Va. L. Rev. 2009, 2034–41 (2011). Along these lines, Professors William Eskridge and 
Judith Levi have argued persuasively that statutory ambiguity and gaps are the actual 
mechanism by which the laws delegate discretion to administrators. See Eskridge & Levi, 
supra note 20, at 1107–11. Statutory precision and detail, by contrast, often operate as con-
straints on executive agencies because administrators must carry out such instructions 
rather mechanically. See id. 
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statutory ambiguity authorizes implementing agencies to exercise dis-
cretion.183 If a statute is ambiguous, courts must defer to the agency’s 
interpretation and gap-filling as long as it is merely “reasonable.”184 
Chevron deference is a cornerstone of administrative law. In 2009, in Ne-
gusie v. Holder, the Supreme Court abruptly turned Chevron from a per-
missive rule into a compulsory rule, and reversed an agency (the Board 
of Immigration Appeals) for having deferred to the Court’s own prece-
dents instead of formulating its own resolution to an ambiguity in the 
law pertaining to refugees.185 The Court’s groundbreaking approach— 
requiring, rather than merely allowing, agencies to interpret their gov-
erning statutes—has startling implications for Chevron analysis and for 
administrative law in general.186 The  Court’s decision in Negusie contin-
ued a trend originating with its 2005 decision in National Cable & Tele-
communications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, which explicitly declared 
a preference for agencies, rather than courts, to fill statutory gaps.187 
But the Court took the much bolder step of transforming this prefer-
ence into a mandate.188 For the sake of clarity and convenience, we re-
fer to this new approach as “injunctive Chevron” to distinguish it from 
classic Chevron jurisprudence. Justice John Paul Stevens, the author of 
Chevron, dissented in Negusie and charged the majority with turning 
                                                                                                                      
183 See 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). 
184 See id. 
185 See Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 516–17, 523 (2009); cf. Mayo Found. for Med. 
Edu
8 (2011); Thomas W. Merrill, Arti-
cle I
 Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980–
85 (
n original) (quoting Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 
551 
c. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 712–14 (2011) (holding that the Treas-
ury Department’s reasonable exercise of its gap-filling authority under the Internal Reve-
nue Code was entitled to Chevron deference). 
186 See Bassina Farbenblum, Executive Deference in U.S. Refugee Law: Internationalist Paths 
Through and Beyond Chevron, 60 Duke L.J. 1059, 1096–9
II, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the Appellate Review Model of Administrative Law, 
111 Colum. L. Rev. 939, 999 & n.292 (2011); Thomas W. Merrill, The Disposing Power of the 
Legislature, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 452, 468–69 (2010). 
187 See
2005) (explaining that expert agencies are better equipped than generalist courts to 
make the delicate policy choices necessary to resolve statutory ambiguities in regulatory 
statutes). 
188 Compare Mayo Found., 131 S. Ct. at 712–14 (explaining that Chevron typically pro-
vides the appropriate standard of review for agency gap-filling “‘where the agency focuses 
fully and directly upon the issue, where the agency uses full notice-and-comment proce-
dures to promulgate a rule, [and] where the resulting rule falls within the statutory grant 
of authority’” (alteration i
U.S. 158, 173 (2007)), with Negusie, 555 U.S. at 516–17, 523 (holding that, in the first 
instance, the Board of Immigration Appeals ought to resolve an ambiguity in the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act). 
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Chevron on its head.189 In 2011, the Court continued in this direction by 
making Chevron a doctrine of preemption as well, holding in American 
Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut that courts cannot initiate interpretation 
of a statute where a particular administrative agency has promised to do 
 in
.195 Standing is yet 
ot
so stead.190 
 The citizen-suit statutes are simply silent about standing. Congress 
placed each of these statutes, however, within a longer act conferring 
primary enforcement authority on an agency.191 The larger acts that 
surround the citizen-suit statutes contain general standards— “intelligi-
ble principles” in the jargon of delegation analysis192—that guide the 
agencies in their endeavors.193 The statutes give an agency authority to 
set standards, develop a monitoring and enforcement plan, and so 
forth.194 It seems logical to infer that this delegated authority to fill in 
the details includes the question of who has standing to bring the re-
lated citizen suits. Legislative silence on nearly every other matter puts 
the issues under the agency’s discretion and purview
an her point that fits into this larger paradigm. 
 Not only does the legislative silence within the citizen-suit provi-
sions serve as an invitation for the relevant agency to fill the gap, but the 
overall structure of the acts also suggests that Congress intended (or 
would have intended, had it considered the question) for the agency to 
fill this gap. For example, the larger statutory framework expressly au-
thorizes agencies to limit all potential citizen suits through preemption 
and displacement.196 Any agency litigation against a violator automati-
                                                                                                                      
189 See Negusie, 555 U.S. at 534 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(arguing that the Court misapplied Chevron deference to a question of pure statutory in-
terp
end-
ing r
 provision); supra note 
25 (
ral directives,” but that it must articulate an intelligible principle 
to g
eeping 
qua –27 and accompanying text. 
anying text. 
-
plem  but that the Act preempts state regulations). 
retation that courts ought to decide). 
190 See 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2538–39 (2011) (holding that the plaintiffs’ federal common law 
nuisance claims were preempted by (1) the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) p
ulemaking and (2) the Clean Air Act’s express provisions for private enforcement). 
191 See id. at 2538–39 (describing the Clean Air Act’s citizen-suit
collecting citizen-suit provisions in various regulatory statutes). 
192 See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372 (noting that Congress is permitted to “delegate[s] 
power under broad gene
uide agency action). 
193 See Bryan Clark & Amanda C. Leiter, Judicial Hide and Seek: What Agencies Can (and 
Can’t) Do to Limit Judicial Review, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 1687, 1700 (2011) (noting that the “intel-
ligible principle requirement does little to constrain Congress’s ability to transfer sw
si-legislative authority to agencies”); supra notes 24
194 See supra notes 25–26 and accomp
195 See, e.g., Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. 
196 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(B) (2006); California v. Dep’t of the Navy, 624 F.2d 
885, 887 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (holding that the states have broad powers to im
ent the provisions of the Clean Air Act,
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cally preempts any citizen suits against the same defendant.197 Thus, 
agencies have express statutory authority to forestall (by a preemptive 
move) any citizen suit that they deem contrary to the policy of the cur-
rent administration.198 Similarly, agencies can “displace” related public 
interest suits brought under common law doctrines.199 This applies even 
when the agency is still in the process of researching and drafting the 
nascent regulations.200 Agencies can also channel citizen suits by defin-
ing, via regulation, the actual violations for which citizens may sue,201 
and through their extensive systems of permits, variances, and specific 
exemptions for the regulated industry.202 Arguably, judicially delineated 
standing requirements such as injury and causation that are within the 
agency’s expertise contradict the statutory schema that Congress cre-
ate
                                                                                                                     
d.203 
 
tion (PSD) Program); id. § 7412(b)(2) (requiring the EPA to keep an up-
date
 waivers); id. § 7474(b)(1)(B) (delineating the PSD pro-
gram
 
197 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(B). 
198 See id. 
199 See, e.g., Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2538–39. 
200 See, e.g., id. 
201 For example, the Clean Air Act authorizes a number of suits. See 42 U.S.C § 7413(b) 
(permitting the EPA to pursue administrative remedies when the state fails to comply with 
or enforce a state implementation plan (SIP)); id. § 7420 (allowing the EPA to issue regu-
lations and collect noncompliance penalties against stationary sources not in compliance 
with the Clean Air Act); id. § 7477 (providing the EPA with the power to prevent modifica-
tions to a major emitting facility that do not comply with the regulations); id. § 7509(a) 
(allowing the EPA to sanction states not in compliance with their own SIPs); id. § 7511(d) 
(allowing EPA enforcement of fees imposed on major stationary sources in “ozone nonat-
tainment areas”). These enforcement provisions, however, depend on the EPA’s defined 
terms published (and updated from time to time) in the relevant regulations. See id. 
§ 7408(a)(1) (requiring the EPA to compile a list of air pollutants “which may reasonably 
be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare”); id. § 7409(b)(1) (requiring the EPA 
to define National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) to allow “an adequate margin 
of safety . . . requisite to protect the public health”); id. § 7411(b) (requiring the EPA to 
publish regulations defining “new” stationary sources subject to the Prevention of Signifi-
cant Deteriora
d list of hazardous air pollutants); id. § 7412(d) (requiring the EPA to promulgate 
regulations establishing emissions standards for each category of major area sources of 
hazardous air pollutants); id. § 7502 (requiring the EPA to designate nonattainment areas 
for NAAQS). 
202 The EPA’s regulations provide a prime example of such a permitting system. See, 
e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7411(c) (delineating new source performance standards (NSPS) permits); 
id. § 7411(j) (delineating NSPS
 permitting process); id. § 7475(d)(2)(D) (providing exemptions to PSD permitting 
requirements); id. § 7503 (delineating nonattainment area permits); id. § 7503(c)(1) (al-
lowing offsets to permit requirements); id. § 7661c (delineating permitting requirements 
for hazardous air pollutants). 
203 We argue that recent Supreme Court decisions have increasingly viewed the rule of 
Chevron deference as a mandate, rather than a discretionary option, meaning that agencies 
must fill gaps in ambiguous statutory language. See, e.g., Mayo Found., 131 S. Ct. at 713–14. 
Following this logic, in conjunction with the clearly ambiguous language of most citizen-
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C. Agency Expertise, Information, and Specialization Relevant to Standing 
  Judicial doctrines of deference to agency interpretation of stat-
utes, which rest upon a presumption of agency expertise and re-
sources,204 suggest that courts would also accede to an agency’s rules 
about standing. The premise underlying judicial deference as articu-
lated in both the Supreme Court’s 1944 decision in Skidmore v. Swift & 
Co. as well as its decision in Chevron is that agencies have staff with rele-
vant expertise and training, and that their specialized functions provide 
agencies with opportunities to analyze the issues deeply.205 Agencies 
conduct extensive research to formulate policy positions and collect 
large quantities of useful data via the reporting requirements imposed 
on the regulated industries.206 
 As the Supreme Court itself recently opined, “The expert agency is 
surely better equipped to do the job than . . . . [f]ederal judges [who] 
lack the scientific, economic, and technological resources an agency 
can utilize . . . .”207 Regarding standing for citizen suits, agencies have 
superior information (compared to private plaintiffs) about how to 
rank or prioritize various violators (potential defendants). Thus, the 
agencies can assess the relative urgency of suing substantial violators on 
one end of the continuum, as opposed to de minimis violators against 
whom citizen suits would arguably be frivolous.208 
                                                                                                                      
suit provisions, the administrative agency must articulate some standards by which private 
ary permits, or the administrative agency 
itse ]ny person may commence a civil action . . . .”). Our 
bifu
cy adminis-
teri y with circumstances, and courts have 
look
r Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2539; cf. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 
323
oncluding that the comprehen-
sive reempted the plaintiff’s federal common law claim). 
persons may sue private industry members allegedly violating the statutory scheme, private 
industry members operating without the necess
lf. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C § 7604(a) (“[A
rcated proposal is the most logical solution to both the statutory ambiguity as well as 
the standing “crisis” as explained in this Article. 
204 E.g., Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. 
205 See id.; Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 137–40 (1944); see also United States v. 
Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 227--29 (2001) (“The fair measure of deference to an agen
ng its own statute has been understood to var
ed to the degree of the agency's care, its consistency, formality, and relative expert-
ness, and to the persuasiveness of the agency’s position.” (footnotes omitted)). 
206 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
207 Am. Elec. Powe
 (1981) (“The agency imposed the conditions it considered best suited to further the 
goals of the Act, and provided detailed progress reports so that it could continually moni-
tor the situation.”). 
208 Cf. Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 323–24 (stating that the EPA imposed the conditions it 
considered best suited to achieve the statutory goals and c
regulatory scheme p
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 The requirements for standing primarily focus on the nature of the 
plaintiff’s injury.209 In the context of pollution-related citizen suits, 
therefore, the nature of the plaintiff’s injury overlaps substantially with 
the scope, scale, and seriousness of the environmental harm.210 Thus, 
the agency must consider how a particular violation fits into the larger 
context of environmental preservation and the total aggregate of viola-
tions. Suppose, for example, that for citizen suits over air pollution, the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) proscribed a minimum thresh-
old of environmental harm that merits an enforcement action, such as 
the affected geographic area (e.g., more than twenty acres) or metric 
tons of emissions (e.g., more than 100,000 tons of emissions). Similar 
benchmarks already permeate the Clean Air Act regulations.211 The 
agency, of course, would select the appropriate levels, put its determi-
nation through the usual notice-and-comment procedures (soliciting 
public comment and addressing the more serious submissions), and 
develop a detailed administrative record to show how it reached its de-
cision.212 The Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) standards for judi-
cial review of agency actions (the default rule is “arbitrary and capri-
cious”)213 force agencies to develop thorough records of their decision 
making and to demonstrate thoughtful consideration of alternatives.214 
This standard of review both suggests that agencies normally serve as 
or
ward the most urgent, crucial cases, and they would help safeguard 
                                                                                                                     
m e consistent and articulate decisionmakers than courts, at least 
within the agencies’ domains of expertise,215 and ensures that agency 
rules on standing derive from extensive deliberation and consideration 
of multiple alternatives. 
 Well-informed, well-theorized guidelines for the requisite injury in 
fact would serve a dual purpose—they would channel citizen suits to-
 
ent, and Other Contested 
Term
providing examples of such definitions). 
ssed a malleable statute 
givin
r the reasoned judgment of the responsible agency.”). 
209 See David N. Cassuto, The Law of Words: Standing, Environm
s, 28 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 79, 86 (2004). 
210 See id. at 86–87. 
211 See supra note 47 (
212 See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419–20 (1971). 
213 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44 & n.12; supra note 18 
and accompanying text. 
214 See, e.g., Penzoil Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 534 F.2d 627, 632 (5th Cir. 1976) (hold-
ing that the agency had to consider, during rulemaking, possible alternatives that would 
promote the same outcome and protect countervailing interests). 
215 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 560 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“This is a 
straightforward administrative-law case, in which Congress has pa
g broad discretion, not to us but to an executive agency. No matter how important the 
underlying policy issues at stake, this Court has no business substituting its own desired 
outcome fo
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against potential abuses of the citizen-suit provisions.216 Potential 
abuses of the provisions could take the form of frivolous claims, or suits 
in which the plaintiff has some ulterior motive that does not align suffi-
ciently with the public interest.217 Allowing agencies to define the req-
uisite injury-in-fact could thus provide a channeling effect to favor 
plaintiffs with a greater personal stake in the claim (who are therefore 
more likely to pursue it diligently and follow through to the end), and 
could better align the citizen-suit plaintiffs with the larger public inter-
est.218 As Congress clearly contemplated citizen suits to supplement the 
agency’s own enforcement efforts,219 the agencies themselves would 
ave
therefore, that the EPA drew a cutoff line for the requisite causation in 
citizen suits—a plausible, specified point between nearly all-inclusive 
“bu
h  the best information or knowledge of where those gaps are, or 
what supplemental litigation would be most helpful from a public pol-
icy standpoint. 
 Similarly, regarding the causation element, we have noted that the 
EPA has decades of experience defining chains of causation for liability 
under CERCLA, RCRA, TSCA, and FIFRA—tracing lines of ownership 
and responsibility for both the affected land and the contaminants 
themselves (manufacturers, sellers, users, and disposers).220 Suppose, 
t-for” causation and an overly strict approach.221 In almost any type 
                                                                                                                      
216 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 Colum. L. 
Rev
 is good reason to believe that 
at le
eces-
sary t although pro-
pon
of a true “adversarial proceeding”). 
219 rinted 
in 5 L 970) 
(“A ci ncies 
will be
220
221 n 
Americ
the cows in the country. 
 
. 1749, 1776–1804 (2007) (discussing the driving principles behind administrative pro-
cedures). 
217 See Adler, supra note 33, at 58–59 (“[T]he priorities of environmental litigation out-
fits and individual citizen-suit plaintiffs will not always align with the public’s interest in 
greater environmental protection. Citizen-suit provisions create incentives for environ-
mentalist plaintiffs to pursue their self-interest. . . . [T]here
ast some environmental litigation is motivated by economic concerns.”). 
218 Cf. Colin Crawford, Pinning Gulliver Down: An Environmental Case Study on the Place of 
Decentralized Power in Federal Administrative Law Doctrine, 4 Fordham Envtl. L. Rev. 47, 61 
(1992) (discussing the catch-22 of citizen intervenors); Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unn
 Constitutional Rulings, 83 N.C. L. Rev. 847, 914–15 (2005) (noting tha
ents of public interest litigation argue for changes in the standing doctrine, most still 
recognize the necessity 
 See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, rep
egislative History of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, at 353 (1
tizen suit provision is based on the assumption that the [f]ederal and [s]tate age
 incompetent, corrupt or otherwise not discharge their responsibilities.”). 
 See supra notes 52–56 and accompanying text (defining these acts). 
 For example, similar arguments were brought to light during oral argument i
an Electric: 
JUSTICE [ANTONIN] SCALIA: [Y]ou’re lumping [the emissions contribu-
tors] all together. Suppose you lump together all 
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of citizen suit, the relevant agencies could give very informed, nuanced 
rules about the appropriate lines for courts to draw on the causation 
element of standing. This would be far superior to the existing practice 
of leaving this task to the courts, as even a single appellate court can 
swing between extremes on the issue of causation,222 as the Supreme 
Court has done.223 The inconsistency of judicial findings on the causa-
tion prong of standing has led to chronic uncertainty in this area and 
disparate, unequal results for similarly situated parties.224 
 Unlike the injury-in-fact inquiry, the causation prong of standing 
shifts the focus to the defendant and the etiological connection be-
                                                                                                                      
Would—would that allow you to sue all those farmers? . . . [D]on’t you have 
to do it defendant by defendant? . . . Cow by cow, or at least farm by farm? 
rly where the 
lump everybody together, so you can lump to-
OD: No. I think that breathers are not really—for one thing, 
aim, and there are various ways to draw the 
 travel three 
mile
08) (holding that the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged standing 
desp
e court). 
[NEW YORK SOLICITOR GENERAL BARBARA] UNDERWOOD: Courts 
sometimes aggregate joint contributors to pollution, particula
remedy that’s sought is injunctive relief. If this were a damage action there 
would be a different problem of allocating to each individual defendant. But 
the relief that’s sought here is the same injunction. 
JUSTICE SCALIA: So you can 
gether all the people in the United States . . . who breathe . . . . 
MS. UNDERWO
they don’t even really contribute carbon dioxide because they absorb as well 
as—exhale it. For another thing, there’s no way that breathing . . . could be 
found unreasonable. . . . 
JUSTICE [SAMUEL] ALITO: [A]nybody who is a substantial contributor 
could be sued? 
MS. UNDERWOOD: Yes. And in terms of determining what—who is a sub-
stantial contributor, there are—because I do think that at some point a com-
pany’s emissions or a cow’s would be too small to give rise to standing or—to 
either standing or a nuisance cl
lines. It’s a familiar task for common law courts to decide how much is sub-
stantial, too. But for an example, if the cut-off were producers of 100,000 tons 
per year, as in the EPA tailoring rule for new sources, just to take an example, 
then according to EPA’s own technical data there would be at most a few 
thousand potential defendants. 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 52–55, Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. 2527 (No. 10-174). 
222 Compare Pollack v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 577 F.3d 736, 741–42 (7th Cir. 2009) 
(“[Plaintiff’s] belief that the bullets affect him is also unlike the air pollution at issue in 
Franklin County, because it is commonly understood that air pollution can
s through the air and different wind conditions could easily blow the pollution onto 
land at that distance. In contrast, it is not readily apparent that Pollack would be affected 
by the shooting at issue here.”), with Sierra Club v. Franklin Cnty. Power of Ill., LLC, 546 
F.3d 918, 927–28 (7th Cir. 20
ite the fact that “no one knows the ultimate magnitude” of their injury). 
223 See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, 
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) (“We need not mince words when we say that the concept of 
‘Art. III standing’ has not been defined with complete consistency in all of the various cases 
decided by this Court . . . .”). 
224 See supra note 222 (illustrating different results from the sam
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tween the supposed perpetrator and the result.225 Agencies have a su-
perior vantage point on this inquiry as well, that is, filtering the pool of 
potential defendants.226 Their expertise and specialized approach to 
etiology or causation would yield better selections of defendants, and 
their rules could better align the targets of citizen suits with the actors 
who pose the greatest direct threats to the public interest. Moreover, 
agencies already entrusted with primary enforcement authority of an 
act will have a repeat-player’s advantage on strategy for enforcement 
litigation.227 Agencies become familiar with how courts respond to dif-
ferent types of claims in the area and strategies for framing issues; they 
see how defendants (violators) approach this type of litigation, their 
propensity for settlement, and their compliance with consent decrees. 
They likely have a nuanced understanding of the balance between 
pushing certain defendants to trial and taking a more conciliatory ap-
roa
f causation required for citi-
                                                                                                                     
p ch to settlement negotiations in order to maximize the result in 
favor of the public interest. 
 The redressability prong of standing should remain with the courts 
rather than agencies, as this falls within the judiciary’s expertise, ex-
perience, and specialized role.228 Even though agencies are better able 
to define the appropriate injury and line o
zen suit eligibility, courts have firsthand knowledge about what reme-
dies they can most effectively administer. 
 An additional factor argues in favor of agency-defined standing 
requirements: the political or democratic dimension. As mentioned 
above, agencies are subject to the notice-and-comment procedures of 
the APA;229 these rules not only enrich the agency decisions with more 
thorough deliberation, but also introduce a healthy democratic compo-
nent into administrative rulemaking.230 Any rules that agencies promul-
 
f the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 
(20
04 U.S. at 560 (noting that the 
plai
nforce-
men
nary Inquiry 66 
(19
 
225 Compare Friends o
00) (“The relevant showing for purposes of Article III standing . . . is not injury to the 
environment but injury to the plaintiff.”), with Lujan, 5
ntiff must show a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of 
such that the injury is “fairly traceable” to the challenged action). 
226 See supra note 48. 
227 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(3) (2006) (providing the EPA with primary e
t authority); supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
228 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that Congress could 
define injury and causation, but making no mention of redressability); supra notes 45–46 
and accompanying text. 
229 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2006); supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text. 
230 See Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Prelimi
69) (describing notice-and-comment procedures as the most “democratic” regulatory 
procedure because they provide the public with open access); cf. Cajun Elec. Power Coop., 
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gate about standing for citizen suits would involve substantial periods of 
public comment,231 and responsive discussion by the agency to the re-
ceived comments before the final regulation appears in the Federal Reg-
ister.232 Activist groups that regularly bring citizen suits would have an 
opportunity to weigh in on the standing rules for future public interest 
lawsuits.233 The activists’ participation in setting their own boundaries 
for future litigation would not only yield useful information, but also 
would enhance the perceived legitimacy of the rules among those they 
affect the most. Another source of political accountability for the agen-
cies is the rigorous Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and Of-
fice of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) review that proposed 
regulations must undergo.234 OMB and OIRA work under close supervi-
sion by the President,235 who is more sensitive to national public senti-
ment than either the courts or the agencies.236 These valuable, democ-
ratizing sources of input on the standing requirements—public 
                                                                                                                      
Inc. v. FERC, 28 F.3d 173, 180 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (holding that the agency’s 
failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing resulted in a substantively flawed decision 
sons an opportu-
nity
Revolu-
tion
creasing citizen participa-
tion nnium: Regulatory Negotiation and the 
Subv 56 (1997) (arguing that negotiated 
rule
83, 503 (2012) (“Political officials are held accountable to 
thei
whereby the agency inadequately explained its administrative decision). 
231 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (requiring that agencies give interested per
 to participate in the rulemaking process “through submission of written data, views, or 
arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation”); Richard J. Pierce, Rulemak-
ing and the Administrative Procedure Act, 32 Tulsa L.J. 185, 185–87 (1996). 
232 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c); Stephen M. Johnson, The Internet Changes Everything: 
izing Public Participation and Access to Government Information Through the Internet, 50 Ad-
min. L. Rev. 277, 281–83 & n.22 (1998) (stating that courts have interpreted the APA re-
quirements to mean that agencies must respond to the received public comments). 
233 Cf. Cary Coglianese, Citizen Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present, and Future, 55 
Duke L.J. 943, 949 (2006) (arguing that “e-rulemaking” is not in
); William Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Mille
ersion of the Public Interest, 46 Duke L.J. 1351, 13
making subverts the agency’s pursuit of the public interest). 
234 See supra notes 34--35 and accompanying text. 
235 See supra notes 34--35 and accompanying text. 
236 See Charles Gardner Geyh, Can the Rule of Law Survive Judicial Politics?, 97 Cornell. 
L. Rev. 191, 195 (2012) (“The legal establishment maintains that judges who are buffered 
from political pressure will . . . follow the law—hence the need for an independent judici-
ary that is insulated from popular and political control.”); Cristina M. Rodriguez, Con-
straint Through Delegation: The Case of Executive Control over Immigration Policy, 59 Duke L.J. 
1787, 1808–09 (2010) (discussing how administrative agencies are subjected to less politi-
cal pressures than the President or Congress in part due to their scientific and regulatory 
expertise); Rebecca E. Zietlow, Popular Originalism? The Tea Party Movement and Constitu-
tional Theory, 64 Fla. L. Rev. 4
r electorates . . . in a way that federal courts are not. This is not to say that courts are 
completely isolated from political pressures. Recent empirical work shows courts are re-
sponsive to political trends.”). 
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comment submission are missing from 
ur 
 courts to fulfill Congress’s in-
nt
e particularly timely at this 
                                                                                                                     
and OMB and OIRA review—
o current regime of ad hoc judicial choices.237 
D. The Need for Extrajudicial Inputs 
 The current system for determining standing is broken. Appellate 
courts continue to issue opinions on standing that are inconsistent, 
confusing, and seemingly results-driven.238 Potential plaintiffs and de-
fendants alike confront an inappropriate level of uncertainty and un-
predictability about anticipated litigation in this regard.239 The ad hoc, 
decentralized nature of judicial determinations for standing are the 
natural consequence of the courts’ lack of expertise and specialized 
knowledge about the proper role of citizen suits. Agencies could pro-
vide better-informed rules, and the enabling statutes suggest that this 
power falls within their existing authority.240 As the U.S. Code increas-
ingly reflects authorization of citizen suits, the courts’ need for guid-
ance on standing increases correspondingly. Courts will need agencies 
to play gatekeeper in order for federal judicial dockets to remain man-
ageable.241 Agencies are better able than
te ions regarding citizen suits. Courts necessarily must take a “blunt-
instrument” approach to standing,242 whereas specialized federal agen-
cies can offer more nuanced guidelines. 
 Finally, as mentioned above, the latest spate of Supreme Court de-
cisions on standing suggest an increasingly liberal—or at least confus-
ing—approach.243 Ultimately, liberalized standing rules facilitate in-
creased citizen-suit activity.244 Thus, we argue, new parameters from an 
appropriate extrajudicial source would b
 
237 See Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 Admin. L. Rev. 
411
pra notes 222--223 (citing conflicting outcomes in 
stan
 that citizens cannot bring suit until 
afte
 civil action). 
 RICO: Standing on the Slippery Slope, 25 Ga. L. 
Rev dispute employed crude tools for 
eval
accompanying text. 
 
in p
, 428–35 (2005) (offering an empirical study on the democratic effects of administra-
tive notice-and-comment procedures). 
238 See Pushaw, supra note 3, at 52; su
ding cases decided by the same court). 
239 See Pushaw, supra note 3, at 52. 
240 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b) (2006) (providing
r they have provided sixty days notice and that private citizen suits are preempted if the 
Administrator is diligently prosecuting a
241 See Pushaw, supra note 3, at 10 n.42 (arguing that courts’ docket control needs ani-
mate prudential standing limitations). 
242 Cf. Virginia G. Maurer, Antitrust and
. 711, 747 (1991) (“[C]ourts and parties to a legal 
uating the standing of civil plaintiffs.”). 
243 See supra notes 122--154 and 
244 See Pushaw, supra note 3, at 32 (“The liberalization of standing sparked a huge rise
ublic interest litigation . . . .”). 
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point. The issues surrou ding cases have grown 
cre
lem for agencies to define 
standing requirements, because it would allow the agency to protect the 
e last objection 
 th
                                                  
nding questionable stan
in asingly complex,245 and the courts have haphazardly solved them 
with conflicting and ambiguous rulings.246 
E. Anticipated Objections 
 This Section anticipates a few objections to our proposal and at-
tempts to offer at least preliminary responses. Three primary objec-
tions seem most pertinent. The first objection is that the judiciary has 
traditionally served as the gatekeeper for the courts and thus judges 
should fashion the standing requirements. The argument follows that 
judges have insider’s experience to identify cases that could cause prob-
lems as they proceed through litigation.247 The second objection is that 
agency capture presents too large a prob
industry through onerous standing requirements.248 Th
is at limiting the ambiguity of standing requirements eliminates the 
more creative citizen-suit standing cases.249 
1. The Judiciary as the Gatekeeper for the Courthouse 
 The most obvious objection to the proposal suggested here is a 
version of the judiciary-as-gatekeeper notion—the idea that the judici-
ary has been the traditional, or is perhaps the most appropriate, gate-
keeper for the courts.250 Historically, judges fashioned the standing re-
quirements, the argument might go, and they used them to avoid 
abuses of the court system,251 to avert awkward constitutional or politi-
cal turf wars with the other branches,252 to preserve judicial econ-
omy,253 and to preempt cases whose outcomes would be futile even if 
                                                                    
 the harms of greenhouse gases). 
n Prong of Standing, 80 Ford-
ham  the standing doctrine’s “gatekeeper” function). 
, supra note 70, at 596–97. But see Bradley S. Clanton, Standing 
and
245 See, e.g., Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 505 (discussing
246 See supra notes 222--223 and accompanying text. 
247 See infra notes 250--268 and accompanying text. 
248 See infra notes 269--285 and accompanying text. 
249 See infra notes 286--299 and accompanying text. 
250 See Luke Meier, Using Tort Law to Understand the Causatio
. L. Rev. 1241, 1245 (2011) (noting
251 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 581 (Stevens, J., concurring) (observing that the Court’s stand-
ing doctrine “preserves the vitality of the adversarial process”). 
252 See Scalia, supra note 2, at 894. 
253 See, e.g., Ho & Ross
 the English Prerogative Writs: The Original Understanding, 63 Brook. L. Rev. 1001, 1008 
(1997) (arguing that scholars overstate the public’s access to the courts at the time the 
Constitution was drafted). 
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the plaintiffs prevailed.254 An institutional competence version of this 
argument might posit that judges have insider’s expertise to flag cases 
that will create unseemly problems as they proceed through litigation, 
such as failure to prosecute the claims, evidentiary and jurisdictional 
problems if the proper parties are not involved in the case,255 or separa-
tion-of-powers issues.256 The judiciary inherently has the greatest insti-
tutional competencies and superior information to screen cases that 
e 
     
th courts should not adjudicate.257 The various versions of this argu-
ment share a common premise: that standing is primarily a screening 
mechanism for the courts, and that those who spend the most time in-
side the courthouse know best which parties should not enter. 
 A cynical reply to this objection might suggest that judges use 
standing requirements to cap—or perhaps reduce—their own case-
loads.258 This would be an ugly example of bureaucratic self-interest on 
the part of the judiciary, but it is conceivable that it occurs in a few cas-
                                                                                                                 
254 See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 680 
F.2d 810, 813–14 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (calling the action moot because the agency reissued a 
cha le in compliance with 5 U.S.C. § 553). 
concerns.”). But see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Issues Raised by Friends 
of t
 a major impetus behind the development of the standing doc-
trin
l over federal jurisdic-
tion
llenged ru
255 See Pushaw, supra note 3, at 3 (“[S]tanding enhances the quality of judicial decisions 
expounding federal law by ensuring that they are made in the context of a concrete dis-
pute between adverse parties with a genuine stake in the outcome . . . .”). 
256 See id. 
257 See Peter M. Shane, The Separation of Powers and the Rule of Law: The Virtues of “Seeing 
the Trees,” 30 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 375, 384 (1989) (noting that courts rely on a variety of 
practical and doctrinal mechanisms to screen cases); cf. William W. Buzbee, Standing and 
the Statutory Universe, 11 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y F. 247, 270 (2001) (“The courts’ critical 
function in standing is to ensure the plaintiff is among the injured, so as to filter the truly 
afflicted from the abstractly distressed.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 915, 
919 (1988) (“[T]he only federal tribunals that can be assigned to resolve justiciable con-
troversies are ‘article III courts,’ whose judges enjoy the safeguards of life tenure and un-
diminished salary.”); The Supreme Court, 2003 Term—Leading Cases, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 248, 
426 (2004) (“Drawing on its abstention and standing jurisprudence, the Court developed 
a prudential standing rule that had the potential to address both judicial federalism and 
institutional competency 
he Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services: Access to the Courts for Environmental Plain-
tiffs, 11 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y F. 207, 228–29 (2001) (stating that courts lack the institu-
tional competence to make determinations of injury and causation for standing in the 
environmental context). 
258 See Pushaw, supra note 3, at 10 n.42 (“Indeed, I have long maintained that this need 
for docket control has been
e. The Court, however, has been reluctant to mention this concern explicitly, likely 
fearing that doing so would be condemned as an illegitimate policy decision that contra-
dicts its long-standing position that Congress has absolute contro
.” (citation omitted)). 
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es.259
e that was supposed to safeguard the 
pa
standing rules are primarily a screening device. It is at least possible to 
     
 This response, which approaches a conspiracy theory of laziness, 
fails to explain the great effort appellate judges have put into rationaliz-
ing their determinations on standing. A pretext for clearing the docket 
would probably be more cursory and dismissive; the opinions on stand-
ing, however, are rather Herculean.260 
 A related and more serious reply would be the oft-suggested con-
cern that judges use standing requirements merely as a proxy for the 
merits, disposing of cases on seemingly sterile procedural grounds as a 
pretext to punish unsympathetic plaintiffs or reward favored defen-
dants.261 The consistent breakdown along partisan lines of Supreme 
Court justices on the issue of standing lends strong support to this idea: 
judges are abusing the gatekeeper function by finding standing for 
plaintiffs they favor and finding no standing for plaintiffs whose cause 
they disfavor, especially in politically controversial public interest litiga-
tion.262 In its worst form, judicial standing requirements could be mere-
ly a means of thwarting congressional intent, especially in the domain 
of social reform legislation.263 In the wake of the Supreme Court’s 1992 
decision in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, in fact, commentators accused 
the Court of using the very devic
se ration of powers to infringe upon the power of the legislative 
branch, frustrating the purpose of environmental citizen-suit stat-
utes.264 A short version of this argument is that standing rules are easier 
to abuse than citizen-suit provisions in the statutes, at least when the 
rules are fashioned entirely by judges. 
 An additional response challenges the underlying premise that 
                                                                                                                 
259 See Pushaw, supra note 2, at 458 (“In the quarter century before 1937, the Court 
adapted justiciability concepts to keep dockets manageable in light of the increasing scope 
of federal law and the appearance of novel forms of action . . . .”). 
260 See, e.g., Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 516–26. 
261 See, e.g., Hessick, supra note 169, at 304–06; see also Transcript of Oral Argument, su-
pra note 221, at 7 (Kennedy, J., questioning) (“[W]e all know that you sometimes have to 
peek at the merits to see if there’s standing. There’s a little cheating that goes on.”); id. at 
11 (Kennedy, J., questioning) (“I’m more receptive to this kind of argument if I know 
we’re going to the merits as opposed to standing.”). 
262 See, e.g., Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 Calif. L. Rev. 68, 69–70 (1984) 
(arguing that the Court has applied the concrete injury requirement to “areas of article III 
investigation for which the requirement is ill suited”); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law 
or P t judges grant standing to 
plai
sted that the Court 
wou
olitics?, 77 N.C. L. Rev. 1741, 1742–43 (1999) (arguing tha
ntiffs who align with their ideological agendas). 
263 See Pushaw, supra note 3, at 38 (“Thus, Lujan and Spear sugge
ld apply its Article III injury-in-fact requirement even when doing so frustrated Con-
gress’s intent.” (citations omitted)). 
264 E.g., Sunstein, What’s Standing?, supra note 5, at 217–18. 
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conceive of standing primarily as a channeling device, and secondarily 
as a screening device.265 That is indeed one way to rephrase the pro-
posal made in this Article. The existence of citizen-suit statutes is prima 
facie evidence that Congress wanted such suits in the courts.266 It is 
more consistent with this evident congressional intent to treat standing 
as a way to align those suits as closely as possible with the overarching 
goals of the relevant act, which is how agencies are likely to approach 
standing rules when they promulgate them.267 The judiciary is more 
gly bogus cases from 
e 
standing rules and thereby to limit (or eliminate) citizen suits. One ver-
sion of this argument might attribute turf-war motivations to the agen-
                                        
likely to treat standing as a way to eliminate seemin
th array of citizen suits, but it seems more likely that Congress would 
want such suits channeled than run through a procedural gauntlet.268 
2. Agency Capture Limits Citizen Suits Excessively 
 Although the last objection focused on the incentives and compe-
tencies of judges, a second objection to our proposal might be that 
agencies have a perverse incentive to promulgate overly restrictive 
cy—a desire to “own” or control all the public interest litigation in its 
                                                                              
265 solici-
tude f
266 m. on 
Air an f Ed-
ward F ); see 
also S. ould 
fail in s en-
forcem
267
ministrative agency to administer a congressionally cre-
of policy and the mak-
 Cf. infra note 326 and accompanying text (describing how the Court’s special 
or states rule promotes the screening and channeling of cases). 
 See Air Pollution—1970: Hearings on S. 3229, S. 3466, and S. 3546 Before the Subcom
d Water Pollution of the Comm. of Pub. Works, 91st Cong. 1483 (1970) (statement o
. Mannino) (“The private suit is an absolute necessity for effective enforcement.”
 Rep. No. 91-1196, at 21 (1970) (“If the Secretary and State and local agencies sh
 their responsibility, the public would be guaranteed the right to seek vigorou
ent action under the citizen suit provisions of section 304.”). 
 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44. Indeed, as the Chevron Court noted: 
The power of an ad
ated . . . program necessarily requires the formulation 
ng rules to fi of ill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress. If Congress 
has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of 
y to elucidate a specific provision of the authority to the agenc statute by regu-
lation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they 
are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. Sometimes the 
legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather 
than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction 
of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the adminis-
trator of an agency. 
Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
268 See S. Rep. No. 91-1196, at 3 (“[T]he committee believes that public participation 
should not be limited to the development of standards and plans.”). 
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respective arena.269 More common and more likely, however, are ver-
sions of this objection that assume agencies are prone to capture by the 
regulated industry itself, which would then seek to shield itself from 
lawsuits by having its puppet agency promulgate insurmountable stand-
ing requirements.270 Yet an even more sophisticated version of this ob-
jection might argue that Congress created citizen suits for the very 
purpose of bypassing what it perceived as already captured agencies 
and turning enforcement over to the citizens themselves.271 Permitting 
the captured entities to rein in citizen suits, the argument might go, 
ou
ould assign 
e j
                                                                                                                     
w ld thus thwart the legislature’s purpose.272 
 This objection mirrors the concern about the judiciary explained 
above—standing requirements fashioned as a pretext to achieve a po-
litical result. One response to this objection, therefore, is that the haz-
ards come out as a wash—if both the judiciary and the agencies have 
incentives to misuse standing to drive certain results and favor certain 
parties, then the concerns cancel each other out and we sh
th ob to the entity with the greatest expertise in the area. 
 That said, agency capture is always a serious concern. Nevertheless, 
the constant complaints from industry about burdensome regulations 
suggest that such capture is far from complete.273 In addition, agency 
capture is more likely to manifest itself in enforcement than in regula-
tions.274 The primary mechanism through which agency capture occurs 
 
 Unconstitutional, 17 
Wm.
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Spy  2, 2009, at A15 (“[T]he culture of pro-
tect few, if any, consequences for failure to 
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vior of government institutions ought to rest on plausible accounts of 
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illian E. Metzger, Federalism and Federal Agency Reform, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 27 
(2011 . 
271
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273  hin-
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shall c ed, 
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269 See Penelope Pether, Constitutional Solipsism: Toward a Thick Doctrine of Article III Duty; 
or Why the Federal Circuits’ Nonprecedential Status Rules Are (Profoundly)
 & Mary Bill Rts. J. 955, 999 (2009) (noting the existence of ideological turf wars 
between the elected and appointed branches of government); Mark Mazzetti, Report Fa
Chief for Inaction on Turf Wars, N.Y. Times, Apr.
ing ‘turf’ remains a problem, and there are 
borate.”); see also Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive 
Political Theory Perspective, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1137, 1184–85 (2001) (noting internal agency 
turf wars, specifically between the EPA and OMB); cf. Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building 
Government in Constitutional Law, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 915, 925 (2005) (noting that “predic-
tions about the beha
interests of the individual officials who direct these institutions”). 
270 Cf. G
) (noting forms of agency capture, including industry capture, the classic form)
 See supra note 219 and accompanying text. 
 See supra note 219 and accompanying text. 
 See e.g., Adler, supra note 33, at 65–66 (noting the regulatory inefficiencies that
siness). But cf. Exec. Order No. 13,563 § 6, 3 C.F.R. 215, 217 (2011) (“[A]ge
onsider how best to promote retrospective analysis of rules that may be outmod
ctive, insufficient, or excessively burdensome, and to modify, streamline, expan
 them . . . .”). 
274 See, e.g., Harry Markopolos, No One Would Listen: A True Financial Thriller 
63 (2010). 
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is presidential appointments of agency directors; the rank-and-file civil 
servant workforce at the agency remains largely intact through election 
cycles. Although a newly appointed director who wants to adopt an in-
dulgent approach toward the regulated industry can easily abstain from 
enforcement, repealing or changing regulations is costly in terms of 
time and resources, as courts require a well-developed administrative 
record for any changes in the rules.275 Favors for the industry, there-
fore, usually will take the form of agency nonenforcement, as it de-
mands no resources and is relatively invisible politically.276 The upshot 
is that an agency rule about standing is likely to remain intact despite 
od
                                                                                                                     
m erate amounts of agency capture. 
 Returning to the more developed version of the argument—that 
citizen-suit provisions assume agency capture and are the legislative 
remedy for it—it merits observing again that Congress already expressly 
gave agencies several ways to preempt, displace, and channel citizen 
 
In fact, after [Bernie] Madoff was arrested, his secretary revealed that the few 
times SEC investigators had come to the firm most of them had asked for 
employment applications. That was typical. If during an exam investigators 
tial for 
age
politically visible re-
spo
id political confrontation.”). 
found a problem, they would report it and issue a deficiency notice or fine, 
but most of these people weren’t looking to derail their careers by bringing 
big, complicated cases that would take years to resolve against the most pow-
erful people in the industry. 
Id. Bernie Madoff orchestrated a sixty-five billion dollar Ponzi scheme that the SEC failed, 
or refused, to discover on numerous occasions. See id. 
275 See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006) (“The reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set 
aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . unsupported by substantial 
evidence . . . or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing.”). 
276 See David Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility 109–11 (1993) (arguing 
that agencies show preference to certain interest groups that essentially pay “rent”); see also 
Ezra Ross & Martin Pritkin, The Collection Gap: Underenforcement of Corporate and White-Collar 
Fines and Penalties, 29 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 453, 505 (2011) (“There are also great incen-
tives for a captured agency to fail to collect fines because it is a win-win situation. The 
agency garners the public relations benefit of appearing to be a tough enforcer and spares 
the regulated firm from bearing the negative effect of the fine.”); Martin Shapiro, Adminis-
trative Discretion: The Next Stage, 92 Yale L.J. 1487, 1515–16 (1983); Danieli Evans, Note, 
Concrete Private Interest in Regulatory Enforcement: Tradable Environmental Resource Rights as a 
Basis for Standing, 29 Yale J. on Reg. 201, 205–06 (2012) (“The latter part of the twentieth 
century saw increasing distrust of federal agencies and awareness of the poten
ncy capture or laxness, leading to inadequate enforcement of regulatory legislation.”); 
Hiroshi Motomura, Comment, Choosing Immigrants, Making Citizens, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 857, 
867 (2007) (“[D]eliberate underenforcement is more a product of political considerations 
than constitutional ones. . . . Facing irreconcilable tensions between 
nses and the underlying urgent need for immigrant labor in many sectors of the econ-
omy, decision-makers can defer tough choices and avo
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su .its
lly 
otic
agency in the long run, at least in theory.282 The captured agency, of 
                                                                                                                     
277 Congressional intent to safeguard citizen suits against agency 
capture is quite ambiguous; at the least, the principle of citizen suits 
being a mitigation measure against capture is not absolute.278 
 Finally, judicial review of the administrative record (“hard look” 
scrutiny)279 and the democratizing features described above (especia
n e-and-comment procedures) provide significant checks on agency 
capture.280 Even where capture occurs, agencies must operate within 
certain boundaries, and this in itself partly answers this objection.281 
 These two objections highlight an asymmetry between the incen-
tives (and, therefore, the agency costs) of the judiciary and the relevant 
agency on standing. Suppose a conservative activist judge disposes of an 
environmental citizen suit based on standing. The judge then enjoys 
the benefit of more free time, as well as the benefit of favoring the cor-
porate defendant and snubbing the environmental activist group who 
brought the suit. A captured agency, however, cannot get the same 
double benefit. To the extent that the agency eliminates citizen suits by 
promulgating insurmountable requirements for standing, those poten-
tial enforcement cases become the agency’s responsibility—helping the 
regulated industry by blocking citizen suits makes more work for the 
 
277 See Metzger, supra note 270, at 8–18 (discussing several of the Court’s recent pre-
emp
 state laws). 
 Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 Yale 
L.J. 
ssing the structure and proc-
esse
ary 
enfo
ausation rules that 
con
forcing both menial and substantial enforcement actions on the agency itself. 
tion decisions). See generally Regulatory Preemption: Are Federal Agencies Usurping Congres-
sional and State Authority?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) 
(discussing the potential dangers of agency preemption of
278 See Adler, supra note 33, at 79 (arguing that excessive citizen suits can discourage ef-
ficient bargaining among plaintiffs and defendants). 
279 See Elizabeth Magill &
1032, 1052 (2011) (“Under ‘hard look’ review, agencies have an obligation to provide 
a reasoned policy analysis for their regulatory choices.”). 
280 See Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72 Chi.-Kent L. 
Rev. 1039, 1050–52 (1997) (describing the theory of agency capture and its implications 
for administrative agencies). 
281 See Magill & Vermeule, supra note 279, at 1056–61 (discu
s of administrative agencies). Arguably, a captured agency is still subject to more proce-
dural limitations than a court crafting procedural standing thresholds. Proof of this can be 
found in the wide range of standing decisions in the past eighty years. See, e.g., Massachusetts, 
549 U.S. at 528 (stating that the EPA’s argument that Congress did not intend for the EPA to 
regulate greenhouse gases was merely a procedural limitation). 
282 An agency has certain nondiscretionary duties of enforcement and rule promulga-
tion. See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C § 552 (2006 & Supp. III 2009) (deline-
ating public disclosure requirements); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b) (2006) (granting EPA prim
rcement authority). If it promulgates standing rules, those rules should contemplate 
realistic enforcement goals. If the agency were to create injury and c
templated unrealistic determinations of injury and overly complex chains of causation, 
then the agency could have indirectly placed large burdens on its own administrative func-
tions by 
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course, can decline to pursue those enforcement claims,283 but eventu-
ally could face repercussions for its indolence from the public284 and 
from a frustrated legislature.285 Thus, when the judiciary abuses the 
standing rules and uses them as a proxy for partisan obstructionism, 
judges give themselves somewhat lighter dockets as well. If a captured 
agency attempts the same move, however, it has the opposite secondary 
L
                                                                                                                     
effect. 
3. osing the Arbitrage Advantages of Decentralized Standards and 
Diversified Agendas 
 A third objection is that uniform, well-developed rules present 
their own hazards, especially when emanating from a centralized au-
thority instead of geographically and hierarchically dispersed sources 
like courts.286 Mistakes in rulemaking become systemic errors—with far 
greater repercussions—when the rulemaking is more centralized and 
concentrated.287 The Supreme Court’s tripartite rules for standing are 
vague and malleable, allowing lower courts to improvise and innovate 
within these general standards.288 Commentators may decry the incon-
 
283 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830–33 (1985) (holding that an agency’s en-
forc
t. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code) (pro-
mot
as passed, in part, because many believed that Wall 
Street  note 
274, a
286  Sei-
denfe
st 
nce will impose on companies that provide jobs and other 
ited 
in t rcement of environmental regulations because they 
hav
ement decisions are entitled to a presumption of unreviewability). 
284 See Seidenfeld & Nugent, supra note 121, at 315 (“[C]itizen participation provides a 
mechanism for controlling agency abuse under the cooperative enforcement model 
. . . .”). 
285 See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Sta
ing stable financial markets by “improving accountability and transparency in the finan-
cial systems”). The Dodd-Frank Act w
 was being regulated by a captured agency—the SEC. See, e.g., Markopolos, supra
t 63, 127. 
 But see Seidenfeld & Nugent, supra note 121, at 270–71. As Professor Mark
ld and Janna Satz Nugent note: 
Regional [EPA] offices also work closely with state enforcement agencies, and 
therefore may be prone to take into account state concerns about the co
that strict complia
en  locb efits to al economies. . . . [C]entral staff members involved in en-
forcement are apt to prefer strict compliance with regulatory requirements. 
Of course, their actions are subject to oversight by political appointees . . . . 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
287 See Adler, supra note 33, at 44 (“Centralized regulatory agencies are further lim
heir ability to provide optimal enfo
e limited [local] information.”); Metzger, supra note 270, at 30 (“The decisions identify 
state law as a mechanism to guard against federal agency failure, and federalism presump-
tions represent an important analytical tool for ensuring that state law is preserved.”). 
288 See Pushaw, supra note 3, at 52. 
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si nt application of the current standing requirements, but such in-
consistency could function as a type of healthy diversification in the 
system, allowing for a degree of benevolent legal arbitrage.
ste
reening 
                                                                                                                     
289 
 Another version of this objection might emphasize the diversified 
policy agendas in enforcement actions when citizen suits can proceed 
without regard to the policy priorities of the agency with primary en-
forcement authority.290 The idea is that citizen suits themselves inher-
ently allow for some policy hedging or arbitrage—whereas the central 
agency focuses on a few types of cases, an unspecified number or variety 
of plaintiffs could help enforcement regimes to branch into other ar-
eas.291 In essence, this objection treats the pervasive uncertainty in this 
area as an opportunity for innovation. If nobody is certain whether a 
new type of plaintiff will have standing, some plaintiffs with break-
through ideas or arguments will at least try.292 Detailed new standing 
requirements, promulgated by a specialized agency, might deter inno-
vative plaintiffs. There is an unknowable, unquantifiable opportunity 
cost, from a progressive policy standpoint, in having increasingly spe-
cific standing rules. In a sense, this objection is a version of the law of 
unintended consequences—except that it is a concern about unforesee-
able consequences.293 To the extent that standing rules are a sc
 
. L. Rev. 605, 620–21 
(200
re acceptable and perhaps even necessary.”). 
en-suit provisions entitle members of the 
public t po-
litical envi-
ronme
291
cessary to identify those environ-
mental impacts which are of greatest concern. This sort of location-specific 
h of centralized regulatory agen-
ctrine must ring with finality, 
lest 
 
289 See Mary Garvey Algero, A Step in the Right Direction: Reducing Intercircuit Conflicts by 
Strengthening the Value of Federal Appellate Court Decisions, 70 Tenn
3) (noting the arguments for and against inconsistent rulings in the federal courts of 
appeals); cf. The Supreme Court, 1997 Term—Leading Cases, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 122, 239 
(1998) (“[C]areful consideration of the nature of scientific evidence helps to explain why 
such inconsistencies a
290 See Adler, supra note 33, at 44 (“Since citiz
 at large to bring suit, subject to minimal constraints, there is little danger tha
considerations will prevent the initiation of a suit necessary to address pressing 
ntal harm.”). 
 See id. As Professor Jonathan Adler notes: 
The environmental impact of various activities will vary from place to place, 
and local knowledge and expertise is ne
information is inherently beyond the reac
ies ps, on the other hac . Local citizen grou nd, may be in a better position to 
observe these effects and act accordingly. 
Id. 
292 See, e.g., Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 505–06. 
293 Cf. Matthew I. Hall, Asymmetrical Jurisdiction, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 1257, 1278 (2011) 
(discussing unintended consequences of Supreme Court decisions on standing, mootness, 
and ripeness); Brian J. Love, Interring the Invention Doctrine, 90 N.C. L. Rev. 379, 458 (2012) 
(“Judicial proclamations abruptly altering long-standing do
antiquated doctrines endure with unintended consequences.”); Michelle P. Bassi, 
Note, La Naturaleza O Pacha Mama De Ecuador: What Doctrine Should Grant Trees Standing?, 11 
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d ce, the ambiguity in the current regime introduces an element of 
Knightian uncertainty
evi
         
294 into the screening of cases—this uncertainty 
can be an environment that fosters breakthrough innovations. 
 This is a very problematic objection, probably the most difficult of 
the three to answer. Ultimately, this is a situation with unavoidable pol-
icy tradeoffs, especially a tradeoff between the known value of agency 
technocrats and the unknown value of citizen activists as innovators.295 
There is also a question of whether Congress places more trust in agen-
cies than it does in the citizenry to carry out its original legislative ob-
jectives. The fact that Congress gave the agencies primary enforcement 
authority—and the ability to preempt, displace, and channel public 
interest litigation by citizens—suggests that the legislature trusts the 
agencies more.296 Moreover, many of the citizen-suit provisions have 
been on the books for three or more decades, allowing ample time to 
see the types of claims that citizen plaintiffs bring.297 The citizen-suit 
provisions tend to be underutilized, and innovative claims seem to clus-
ter in the first decade or so after enactment of a citizen-suit provision, 
plateauing after that, as path dependence besets the activist groups who 
bring most of the suits.298 In other words, although no one can quantify 
the unknown opportunity costs, we also have little evidence to suggest 
                                                                                                             
r. R
or changes; it originated with economist Frank Knight. See generally Frank H. Knight, Risk, 
O ev. Int’l L. 461, 467–68 (2009) (discussing the unintended consequences of more 
liberal standing doctrines in other contexts). 
294 “Knightian uncertainty” in economic theory refers generally to unquantifiable risks 
Uncertainty and Profit (1921) (introducing Knight’s theory). Knight drew a distinc-
tion between “uncertainty” (unknowable odds or range of possibilities) and “risk” (known 
probabilities) for purposes of illustrating the difference between net revenues and windfall 
profits for entrepreneurs. The distinction between risk and uncertainty has become a use-
ful analytical tool in a number of fields. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson et al., Contracting for Inno-
vation: Vertical Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 431, 433 n.2 
(2009); Dru Stevenson, Toward a New Theory of Notice and Deterrence, 26 Cardozo L. Rev. 
1535, 1575–76 n.180 (2005) (“[K]nightian uncertainty . . . involve[s] a finite set of reason-
able possibilities where it is impossible to ascertain beforehand which is more likely, or 
how much more likely.”); see also Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity and Decision 4 
(2001) (discussing the claim “that for a reasonable man all ‘uncertainties,’ in Knightian 
terms, may be expressed numerically as ‘risks’”); Joseph Greenberg, The Right to Remain 
Silent, in Uncertainty in Economic Theory: Essays in Honor of David Schmeidler’s 
65th Birthday 521, 521–30 (Itzhak Gilboa, ed., 2004) (discussing Knightian uncertainty 
in the context of individuals’ communications with the police). 
295 See Adler, supra note 33, at 40–41. 
296 See supra notes 175--177 and accompanying text. 
297 See Adler, supra note 33, at 43 (“[S]tarting in 1970[,] Congress enacted environ-
mental citizen-suit provisions . . . .”). 
298 See James R. May, The Availability of State Environmental Citizen Suits, Nat. Resources 
& Env’t, Spring 2004, at 53, 53 (noting an underutilization of state and federal citizen 
suits). 
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that refined rules for standing would have an undue chilling effect on 
new categories of claims. Even so, there is little empirical research on 
the fluctuations in innovation among citizen suits over time and the 
etiology of such trends; this is an area deserving further research. 
 An additional response, intertwined within our channeling theory, 
is that the proposed secondary thesis, the special solicitude rule, fills the 
“innovative gap” that any channeled, streamlined standing rule crafted 
by agencies would inherently create. Take, for example, a hypothetical 
situation in which private parties bring suit after an agency has imple-
mented this Article’s primary thesis by promulgating specific and nar-
row rules defining injury and causation for standing. Any private parties 
intending to make arguments for standing that do not comport with the 
standing rules as determined by the agency will have no ability to reach 
federal court. The private parties would, however, have the option of 
petitioning their state attorney general to pursue the public interest 
claim on their behalf. The state attorneys general, as our secondary the-
sis proposes, would create opportunities for potentially innovative and 
progressive standing arguments because the attorneys general receive 
special deference under the special solicitude rule articulated in the 
2007 Supreme Co  Thus, although 
e p
for suing federal agencies. This is the “special solicitude for states” rule 
adopted in 2007 by the U.S. Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA.301 
The rule would bring greater clarity, and uniformity, to citizen suits 
aro  agencies endorsed this rule formally in the Fed-
                                                                      
urt decision in Massachusetts v. EPA.299
th ublic interest is still channeled, it is no longer channeled through 
the administrative and judicial systems; rather, it is first channeled 
through the executive branch of its state government, where the state 
attorney general must be convinced that the cause is compelling. 
IV. Special Solicitude for States 
 The second prong of our proposal pertains to actions against the 
federal regulatory agencies themselves,300 as opposed to citizen suits 
against private-sector violators that supplement the agency’s own en-
forcement. The thesis here is rather simple: states should have relaxed 
standing requirements, compared to private parties or activist groups, 
und the country if
                                                
299 549 U.S. at 518–20. 
300 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2) (providing for a citizen cause of action against the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the Clean Air Act). 
301 See 549 U.S. 497, 518–20 (2007). 
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eral Register.302 It would also be helpful to courts and potential litigants 
for the agencies to delineate that this is a rule of preference, not an 
outright bar to suits by non-state plaintiffs.303 This second prong of the 
proposal is an extension of the idea that standing requirements should 
serve a channeling function and thus more than a mere screening 
function. Favoring states in these types of suits is an explicit application 
 thof e channeling idea, as most suits would be channeled through the 
state attorneys general.304 
 Suits brought against federal agencies by state attorneys general 
raise issues of standing often enough to merit discussion together with 
the first type of citizen suits;305 yet, they are sufficiently distinct to re-
quire a different rule for standing. In addition, this prong is logically 
severable from the first—readers could disagree with the proposed rule 
regarding suits against agencies, but still accept that agencies should 
define standing for citizen suits against third parties.306 Suits against 
agencies have important features in common with citizen suits against 
violators. Both types of actions originate from statutory authorizations 
to sue;307 both types contemplate injunctive relief rather than damages 
                                                                                                                      
302 See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption in Environmental Law: Formalism, Federal-
ism Theory, and Default Rules, in Federal Preemption: States’ Powers, National Inter-
ests 166 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greeve eds., 2007) (discussing how modern 
preemption allows agencies to create uniformity in laws and national policies). 
303 This would parallel the Massachusetts decision because the majority did not exempt 
private parties from their decision but simply awarded special deference to the state due to 
its quasi-sovereign interest. See 549 U.S. at 518–20; Gregory Bradford, Note, Simplifying State 
Standing: The Role of Sovereign Interests in Future Climate Change Litigation, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 
1065, 1096–1100 (2011) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts iden-
tifie , not only in protecting its citizens but 
also ve agreed that the Court may have 
view
.S. 490, 499 (1975) (“[E]ven when the plaintiff has alleged injury 
suff y’ requirement, this Court has held that the plain-
tiff 
 
sub
4(a) (2006). 
d concrete injuries to the State’s unique interests
 in preserving its territorial integrity). Others ha
ed the State as an agent for its citizens, rather than as a sovereign protector of its citi-
zens. See Calvin Massey, State Standing After Massachusetts v. EPA, 61 Fla. L. Rev. 249, 264–
68 (2009) (“[T]he Court . . . was actually saying that a state has standing to assert the rights 
of its residents under federal law.”). 
304 See, e.g., Stevenson, supra note 102, at 37–38. 
305 See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text. 
306 This would be consistent with the Supreme Court’s standing jurisprudence. See, e.g., 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U
icient to meet the ‘case or controvers
generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to 
relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.”). We do not propose changes in the
stance of the judiciary’s prudential limitations; we merely propose that administrative 
agencies take the Supreme Court up on its offer to define the injury and causation prongs 
of Article III standing. 
307 E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 760
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as the primary remedy;308 and both focus on matters primarily en-
trusted to the relevant agency by Congress.309 Claims against the 
agency, as well as claims brought in the shoes of the agency (so to 
speak),310 touch on underlying political and philosophical issues of the 
a cy’s competence, optimal levels of regulation, and the judiciary’s 
competence to evaluate matters entrusted to the expertise of specialists. 
 The two types of claims also differ in several important ways. The 
most important is the nature of the defendant—a private party as op-
posed to the government itself, which has innumerable implications for 
litigation resources, incomplete waiver of sovereignty, political account-
ability, and procedural protocols. Different statutory provisions furnish 
the basis for the two types of actions, though the subject matter is large-
ly the same.
gen
 defendant of omission, which results in a 
ery
311 The suits we discuss primarily challenge agency inac-
tion312—or, in some cases, challenge an agency for acting but not going 
far enough313—and accuse a
v  different type of case than accusing an agency of a transgression of 
the law, as with polluters.314 
 Given the differences between actions against agencies and actions 
supplementing the agency’s own enforcement efforts, a different ap-
                                                                                                                      
308 E.g., id. § 7604(g) (“Penalties received under subsection (a) of this section shall be 
deposited in a special fund in the United States Treasury for licensing and other services.”). 
309 Cf. id. § 7604(a)(2) (“[A]ny person may commence a civil action on his own behalf 
. . . against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to per-
form
 private parties acting as “private attorneys general.” See William B. 
Rub
lgate rules whereas the previous challenges 
to in
ins, 524 U.S. 11, 13–14 (1998) (challenging 
the 
ions); Heckler, 470 U.S. at 846–49 
(Ma phasizing that agencies cannot justify the unreviewability of 
agen  relying on prosecutorial discretion). 
 any act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary with the Administrator 
. . . .” (emphasis added)). 
310 This is known as
enstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—And Why It Matters, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 
2129, 2130–33 (2004). 
311 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1) (authorizing citizen suits against “any person”), with 
id. § 7604(a)(2) (authorizing citizen suits against the EPA). 
312 See, e.g., Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 505. But note that Massachusetts is a unique case 
because it challenged agency inaction to promu
action concerned refusals to enforce. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832–33 
(1985); Metzger, supra note 270, at 41 & n.190. 
313 See Frank B. Cross, Rethinking Environmental Citizen Suits, 8 Temp. Envtl. L. & Tech. 
J. 55, 56 (1989); see also Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 490 (2009) (challeng-
ing the U.S. Forest Service’s lenient permitting of commercial logging operations); Dep’t 
of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 756 (2004) (challenging the Federal Motor Car-
rier Safety Administration for not restricting Mexican trucks from entering the United 
States in order to reduce pollution); FEC v. Ak
FEC for not imposing stricter political fundraising reporting requirements on the 
American Israel Public Affairs Committee). 
314 See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 166 (1997) (confirming standing to petition the 
Court to prevent application of environmental restrict
rshall, J., concurring) (em
cy inaction by
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proach to standing is appropriate. The Supreme Court drew this same 
distinction in Massachusetts, adopting the special solicitude rule regard-
ing states’ standing to sue federal agencies.315 In Massachusetts, a con-
sortium of states sued the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to 
compel it to regulate greenhouse gases.316 The Court based its holding 
on three legal disadvantages confronting states: the Constitution’s pro-
hibitions on individual states signing treaties with foreign powers, 
states’ inability to take punitive action against other states to retaliate 
over negative externalities (such as cross-border pollution), and statu-
tory preemption, rooted in the Supremacy Clause, which limits states’ 
ability to address certain problems through local legislation.317 Each 
state voluntarily joined the Union, Justice John Paul Stevens observed, 
and surrendered rights they would otherwise have had in each of these 
three domains (threatening force against contiguous neighbors, con-
summating treaties with other countries, and even passing some of 
their own laws and regulations) in order to participate in the greater 
Nation.318 States thus left themselves somewhat helpless and vulner-
able, and relied upon the federal government to provide commensu-
rate protections in return.319 Special solicitude for states applies more 
to agency refusals to regulate than to lack of enforcement.320 Typically, 
it is easier to find a statutory mandate or duty for rulemaking.321 Rule-
making is more time-consuming and costly for the agencies than en-
forcement proceedings.322 Thus, agencies are resistant to investing re-
                                                                                                                      
519–20. 
itehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/reports/2010_Benefit_Cost_Report
.pdf
2011), http://nepis.epa.gov/Adobe/PDF/P10069PG.PDF (not-
ing 
315 See 549 U.S. at 
316 Id. at 505. 
317 See id. at 519–20. 
318 See id. at 519. 
319 See id. at 519–20. 
320 Id. at 532–35. 
321 See 549 U.S. at 527 (“[Agency] discretion is at its height when the agency decides 
not to bring an enforcement action.”); Heckler, 470 U.S. at 833 n.4 (indicating that abdica-
tion of statutory responsibilities was a genuine concern, even if the facts in Heckler did not 
rise to this level, as might refusals to regulate). 
322 Compare Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, 2010 Report 
to Congress on the Benefits and Costs of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Man-
dates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities 11–12 tbl.1-1 (2010), available at http:// 
www.wh
 (estimating select agency rulemaking costs to be between $42.7–$54.597 billion, and 
estimating rulemaking costs for the EPA to be between $25.789–$29.227 billion), with EPA, 
FY 2011 Budget in Brief 7 (
that the EPA’s enforcement-and-compliance budget for the 2011 fiscal year is $618 mil-
lion). 
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sources into new rulemaking, especially in controversial areas.323 The 
rulemaking process, being more tedious and less flexible than en-
forcement, is therefore less responsive to genuine crises or public out-
cry for government action.324 Agencies are more likely to need prod-
                                                     
ding from the courts for rulemaking than they would for 
enforcement.325 In any case, the fact that the Supreme Court adopted 
the special solicitude rule for states would seem to show that the Court 
is prepared to treat standing as a channeling device, not merely a 
screening device.326 
 Although the Court based its special solicitude rule entirely on the 
legal handicaps that states must endure, there are also positive policy 
reasons for channeling these suits through the state governments—in 
practice, state attorneys general can better represent the interests of the 
public as a whole, rather than individualistic, private concerns that 
could motivate private plaintiffs.327 Most states have an elected attorney 
general who directly represents the voters—a statewide constituency— 
and the remaining attorneys general are appointed by the governor.328 
State attorneys general have an incentive to prioritize their actions and 
sue when the agency’s neglect affects the largest number of people and 
the broadest geographic area.329 From an overarching policy stand-
point, such representativeness, political accountability, and prioritiza-
tion would be healthful contributions to this field of litigation.330 
                                                                 
323 See, e.g., John M. Broder, E.P.A. Delays Rule on Power Plant Emissions, N.Y. Times 
( June 13, 2011, 4:23 PM), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/13/e-p-a-delays-rule- 
on-p
king 
pro
proceedings 
(rat rve a regime of 
excl mptroller while honoring in fact rather than 
mer re-empt substantive state law.”). 
02, at 40. 
t 39. 
n, supra note 102, at 40–41. 
ower-plant-emissions/. 
324 See Alfred C. Aman, Jr. & William T. Mayton, Administrative Law 99–110 (2d 
ed. 2001). 
325 See, e.g., Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 535 (requiring the EPA to initiate a rulema
cess). But see Exec. Order No. 13,514 § 2, 3 C.F.R. 248, 249 (2009) (requiring the EPA 
to set a greenhouse gas emissions target). Thus, Massachusetts sparked the need for rule-
making, but President Obama’s executive order actually set the wheels in motion. 
326 See Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 698, 737 
(2011) (“State enforcement is distinguished not only by the familiar divisions between 
state and federal interests, but also by features that are peculiar to enforcement: the char-
acteristics of elected attorneys general compared to specialist federal agencies . . . . En-
forcement authority is also different from regulatory authority as a channel for state influ-
ence.”(emphasis added)); see also Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 557 U.S. 519, 530 
(2009) (“Channeling state attorneys general into judicial law-enforcement 
her than allowing them to exercise ‘visitorial’ oversight) would prese
usive administrative oversight by the Co
ely in theory Congress’s decision not to p
327 See Lemos, supra note 326, at 702; Stevenson, supra note 1
328 See Stevenson, supra note 102, a
329 See Lemos, supra note 326, at 721–30. 
330 See id. at 702; Stevenso
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M eover, state attorneys general often collaborate with their counter-
parts in other states in bringing these suits against the federal govern-
ment, as in Massachusetts.
or
en
agency, exchanging information, negotiating approval of parts of its 
                                                                                                                     
331 These consortiums allow the representa-
tion to reach a regional scale—cases representing the citizens in several 
states and hundreds of thousands of square miles (geographic coverage 
is very relevant for pollution cases).332 
 There are other policy reasons to channel cases against federal 
agencies primarily through the states. States have more resources than 
private citizen groups to pursue long-term, highly complex litigation 
against the federal government.333 Many of these cases against federal 
ag cies involve difficult questions of federal power,334 the extent of 
statutory delegations to agencies,335 and the fine line between political 
questions and appropriate inquiries for adjudication,336 meaning that 
the cases are likely to reach the courts of appeals and often the Su-
preme Court, as in Massachusetts. States, especially those working in 
consortium, have greater litigation endurance than private plaintiffs.337 
 Similarly, state attorneys general often have superior information 
about the subject matter compared to private plaintiffs.338 Most of the 
major federal environmental statutes include detailed provisions for 
state cooperative enforcement, regulatory, and monitoring efforts (for 
example, state implementation plans under the Clean Air Act);339 every 
state government has an ongoing relationship with the relevant federal 
 
oval 
pro -warn product liability claims); Altria Grp., 
Inc.
sachusetts, 549 U.S. at 505. 
 the 
Fede discussing 
rece
ra note 102, at 51 (noting a trend favoring collaborative efforts). 
331 Lemos, supra note 326, at 720. 
332 See id. at 721 (“[E]lected state attorneys general have strong incentives to serve 
their local constituencies.”). 
333 See Stevenson, supra note 102, at 51. 
334 See Cuomo, 557 U.S. at 533--34 (rejecting a claim that state enforcement was pre-
empted on federalism-based preemption grounds); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 558–59 
(2009) (providing that the Food and Drug Administration’s drug warning label appr
cess does not preempt state law failure-to
 v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 73 (2008) (providing that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and 
Advertising Act did not preempt plaintiffs state law claim regarding “light” cigarettes). 
335 See, e.g., Mas
336 See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Judicial Review and the Political Question Doctrine: Reviving
ralist “Rebuttable Presumption” Analysis, 80 N.C. L Rev. 1165, 1179–82 (2002) (
nt decisions). 
337 Stevenson, sup
338 See Lemos, supra note 326, at 721 (noting the states’ superior resources). 
339 See e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A) (2006); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7410(a)(2) (2006). 
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implementation plan and permitting systems, and so forth.340 The 
states, in other words, have experience doing much of the same work 
n order to demonstrate that it 
ou
that the defendant federal agency does, and even have experience do-
ing the type of thing that the lawsuits allege the agency has neglected. 
Finally, state attorneys general have firsthand knowledge of the process 
of promulgating regulations and bringing enforcement actions against 
violators.341 
 Private plaintiffs, such as the Sierra Club or the Natural Resources 
Defense Council (NRDC), can easily collaborate with the state attor-
neys general in bringing these suits.342 Rather than encumbering these 
activist groups, joining with the state attorney general broadens the suit 
in scope and resources.343 At the same time, a state attorney general is 
more likely to commence an action if large, reputable citizen action 
groups (Sierra Club, etc.) approach the official requesting cooperation 
and assistance, and offer their own evidence and support.344 In the 
event that the state attorney general declines the overture, the citizen 
group is free to pursue the claim as it would have before, but it will 
have to do more than the state would i
sh ld have standing.345 The rule proposed here would incentivize citi-
zen action groups to cooperate with the state attorneys general, giving 
valuable input to the attorneys general, and with each other, because a 
united coalition of citizen groups is more likely to attract the attention 
and support of the attorneys general.346 
 Citizen suits against agencies are part of the statutory scheme and 
can bring healthy pressure to bear on indolent officials—but at the 
                                                                                                                      
340 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 Yale 
L.J. 
the Role of State Attorneys 
Gen
f 
Jeffr ing that private plaintiffs and nongovern-
men
eys general are heavily motivated 
by p
possible manifestation of the same 
phe igation partnerships between activist groups and 
state
1256, 1262–63 & nn.14–16 (2009); Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New 
Federalism, 57 Duke L.J. 2023, 2038 & n.54 (2008). 
341 See Jason Lynch, Note, Federalism, Separation of Powers, and 
eral in Multistate Litigation, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1998, 2003–04 (2001) (discussing coop-
eration among state attorneys general on antitrust enforcement). 
342 See e.g., Symposium, The Role of State Attorneys General in National Environmental Policy: 
Global Warming Panel, Part II, 30 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 351, 369–70 (2005) (comments o
ey Sachs, Dir., Columbia Earth Inst.) (not
tal organizations often have scientific expertise relevant to environmental litigation). 
343 See Stevenson, supra note 102, at 50–51. 
344 Cf. Lemos, supra note 326, at 722 (“[S]tate attorn
olitical considerations. . . . [E]lected attorneys general have incentives to take actions 
that will respond to the interests of their constituents.”). 
345 See, e.g., Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 343–49 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(upholding standing), rev’d on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011). 
346 See Stevenson, supra note 102, at 50 (“Another 
nomenon would be an increase in lit
 [attorney general’s] offices . . . .”). 
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same time, these suits present inherent policy concerns that color court 
decisions on standing.347 These suits necessarily divert agency resources 
into defensive litigation—resources that could have supported more 
enforcement, policy research, and so forth. The special solicitude rule 
does not bar private plaintiffs,348 and courts still have leeway to allow the 
most important cases to proceed—those where the injury is the greatest 
and causation is most proximate.349 Nevertheless, encouraging coali-
tions between citizen action groups and state attorneys general exploits 
the channeling effects of the standing requirements, rather than merely 
excluding cases or screening plaintiffs. The current regime, in contrast, 
gives courts a perverse incentive to use standing to screen out the big-
gest cases—those that would impose the greatest cost on agency re-
sources if successful, as in the 1977 Supreme Court case E. I. DuPont de 
Nemours & Co. v. Train.350 At the same time, the current standing rules 
may encourage courts to allow more picayune claims against the agency, 
 th
about standing for third-party citizen suits, it could generate confusion 
     
as ese claims will seem more concrete and particularized, even though 
they are less representative and less concerned about the public inter-
est.351 The special solicitude rule does the opposite, favoring the cases 
that affect the most people and the largest area, and requiring plaintiffs 
with more idiosyncratic views to demonstrate why they should have 
standing in a case that affects the public at large.352 
 If the Supreme Court already adopted a rule of special solicitude 
for states, why do agencies need to bother reiterating it through their 
own promulgated rules? First, if agencies are going to promulgate rules 
                                                                                                                 
347 See Adler, supra note 33, at 63–69. 
348 See supra note 303 and accompanying text. 
ach individual direct discharge. See id. The use of this method was chal-
leng
 determined that the EPA’s limitations were 
reas
“Elected, generalist state attorneys general share 
littl
349 See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2360 (2011) (9--0 decision favoring 
Article III standing); Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP., 131 S. Ct. 863, 870 (2011) (8–0 
decision favoring zone-of-interests standing). 
350 See, e.g., 430 U.S. 112, 115 (1977). In DuPont, the EPA had taken a practical ap-
proach to regulation under the Clean Water Act by establishing industrial categories for 
direct discharges of pollutants and correlating effluent limitations for each category. See id. 
at 135–36 & n.25. The purpose of this was to avoid the daunting task of establishing efflu-
ent limitations for e
ed. Fortunately, the Supreme Court considered the “impossible burden” of regulating 
42,000 direct dischargers seeking permits and
onable. See id. 
351 See Pushaw, supra note 3, at 8 (discussing the liberalization of standing and how it 
has frustrated the Court’s “stated purposes”). 
352 See Lemos, supra note 326, at 701 (
e in common with the appointed, specialist agency officials who are the typical agents 
of federal enforcement. The result is a brand of public enforcement that differs markedly 
from the more familiar federal model.”). 
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if they do not specify that a different rule would apply to suits against 
the agencies themselves. To allay concerns about self-interest when the 
agency is making a rule about suits against itself, the agencies can ex-
nds a signal to potential plaintiffs (such as the Sierra 
Club and NRDC), but will also foster quicker uniformity among the 
courts. It also signals to agen that inaction or negligence 
 t
ice or docket manage-
plicitly adopt the exogenous rule proposed by the Supreme Court— 
special solicitude for states.353 If agencies do not differentiate between 
standing for suits against third-party violators and suits against the 
agency, courts could easily assume that the same agency self-interest has 
tainted the rule for private citizen suits, which is not the case. 
 It is also important for the agencies to provide a united front with 
the Massachusetts Court in shifting from treating standing as a screening 
device toward using it as a way to channel suits through the best-
equipped, most representative parties. Channeling is a conceptual chal-
lenge to the paradigm many players in this arena have been using. A 
united front between the agencies and the Supreme Court on this 
point not only se
cy personnel 
on heir part could trigger state attorney general actions, giving agen-
cies an incentive to be more proactive and diligent in discharging their 
statutory duties. 
Conclusion 
  The requirements for standing are a relatively recent develop-
ment in the American legal system, arising at the same time as various 
forms of public interest litigation. The historical trajectory is a jagged, 
nonmonotonic trend toward liberalized rules for standing, but a lack of 
guidance from Congress combined with the politically controversial 
nature of public interest litigation has led courts to reach haphazard 
results as they implement the rules. The meandering pattern is due in 
part to courts using standing as a screening dev
ment mechanism rather than as a channeling tool to maximize the 
overall societal benefit from such litigation. The current state of the law 
presents too much uncertainty for judges and unpredictability for po-
                                                                                                                      
353 The Supreme Court has a history of willingness to award great deference to admin-
istrative agencies when the agencies comply with previous judicial rulings. For example, 
the Court held in Massachusetts that the EPA must decide whether carbon dioxide is a haz-
ardous pollutant under Section 202 of the Clean Air Act, and if so, issue regulations plac-
ing limitations on its emissions. See 549 U.S. at 534–35. Then, in the 2011 case American 
Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, the Court allowed the EPA’s plan to promulgate a new 
source regulation to displace any common law nuisance action, despite concerns that the 
EPA’s rulemaking process was languishing. See 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2538–39 (2011). 
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e obligatory notice-and-comment period and 
development of an administrative record that comprise such agency 
rulemaking. Even for suits against agencies themselves, there would be 
significant benefits in having agencies adopt the Supreme Court’s “spe-
cial solicitude for states” approach as a rule for such cases. Most impor-
tantly, standing could serve more of a channeling function than merely 
being a screening mechanism, aligning citizen suits more completely 
with the public interest. 
tential litigants. Courts and commentators have called for Congress to 
give guidance on this point, so far without avail. 
 In every case in which Congress has authorized citizen suits, it has 
given primary enforcement powers to a particular federal agency, such 
as the Environmental Protection Agency. Congress’s silence on the 
question of standing for citizen suits is a statutory gap that the relevant 
agency can and should fill, using its specialized expertise in that area. 
Agency input would be particularly helpful on the questions of injury-in-
fact and causation. Promulgated rules for standing would give the courts 
concrete benchmarks, tailored for the particular type of citizen suit to 
accomplish its statutory goals most effectively. It would also make the 
process of fashioning the standing requirements more democratic and 
representative, due to th
